Teh Exclusionary Rule by Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
California Assembly California Documents
9-29-1980
Teh Exclusionary Rule
Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_assembly
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Hearing is brought to you for free and open access by the California Documents at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in California Assembly by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation












· Assembly Committee on Criminal justice 
Monterey, California 
September 29, 1980 
BILL McVITTIE, Chairman 
WILLIE L. BROWN, JR., Vice Chairman 
DAVE STI RUNG 
Michael S. Ullman, Chief Consl!lltant 
Peter J. jensen, Principal Consultant 
Darlene E. Fridley, Committee Secretary 
ROSS JOHNSON 





























.. . .} .· ii 
. .. - "":: "' ,__ 
1 
·- ' ·. MEMBERS PRESENT 
Bill McVittie, Chairman 
Jack Knox, Assemblyman \~'! ~ !BR,~RV 
Elihu Harris, Assemblyman 
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY 
Michael Ullman, Chief Consultant 
Peter Jensen, Consultant 
Darlene Fridley, Committee Secretary 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE, SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95826 
TELEPHONE (916) 383-3601 
iii 
1 I N D E X 
2 
3 Proceedings 1 
4 Introduction by Chairman McVittie 1 
5 Testimony of Justice Bernard Jefferson 2 
6 Testimony of District Attorney John Van De Kamp, 
Los Angeles County 19 
7 
Testimony of District Attorney Lowell Jensen, 
8 Alameda County 
9 Testimony of Mr. John Cleary, California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
10 
Testimony of Mr. Michael McClure, California 
11 Trial Lawyers Association 
12 Testimony of Mr. Clifford Thompson, Attorney 
General's Office 
u 
Testimony of Mr. Jim Tucker, American Civil 
14 Liberties Union 
15 Testimony of Mr. Maurice Oppenheim, Criminal 
Law Section of the California State Bar 
16 
Testimony of Ms. Judy Allen, State Public 
17 Defender's Office 
18 Adjournment 






PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN ORIIIE, SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 








































P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
--oOo--
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Good afternoon ladies and 
gentlemen. On behalf of the committee, let me apologize 
for our tardiness in starting. The Assembly Judiciary 
Committee heard various matters this morning, and they 
adjourned late, and then called the birthday of our senior 
member, Jack Knox. And there was a little going away party 
for him at a local restaurant. So I do apologize for having 
kept the members of the public here. 
Today we have the interim hearing on the exclusiona~y 
rule. I'd like to introduce the members of the committee 
that are here, before we go further. 
To my left is the person whom I referred to previ-
ously, senior member of the committee, in fact the dean 
of the Legislature who is retiring at the end of this session 
Jack Knox from Richmond. To my right, in this location 
only, we have a first term member, Ellihu Harris from I 
guess it's Berkeley. We have our two consultants here, 
two of our three consultants, to the far right Michael 
Ullman, and to my far right Peter Jensen. And we have 
our committee secretary here as well, Darlene. 
We have asked the witnesses to focus on a number 
of issues relative to the exclusionary rule. In particular, 
the alternatives to the rule, the basis of the decision 
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1 between the federal and the California standards, and whether 
2 as one commentary has suggested, the dissatisfaction with 
3 the exclusionary rule. It's really based on the discontent 
4 with the Fourth Amendment. 
5 In addition, I would ask those persons who do 
6 testify to comment on the recent report of the Controller 
7 General of the United States to Senator Edward Kennedy, 
8 which included that, and I quote: 
9 "One four-tenths of one percent of 
10 the decline of the defendants' cases or 
11 studies were declined due to Fourth Amend-
12. ment search and seizure problems." 
13 Now as I understand it today, our first witness 
14 today is District Attorney John Van De Kamp. 
15 JUDGE JEFFERSON: That's not the way it's listed 
16 in the --
17 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: That's right. 
18 JUDGE JEFFERSON: I'm Bernard Jefferson, and 
19 I see I'm listed first, and I'd like to be able to speak 
2.0 first. 
21 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Absolutely. 
22 John, we'll take Justice Jefferson. 
Thank you, Judge. 2.J 
24 JUDGE JEFFERSON: I hope am not keeping Mr. Jensen, 
25 putting him to too much trouble, but I also have other 
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things to do. 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: That's fine. You're first 
on the agenda, as printed up. 
JUDGE JEFFERSON: Let me address your first ques-
tion: 
"Is the exclusionary rule constitution-
ally required, or is it a judicial procedure 
capable of abolition by the legislative 
branch?" 
I don't think it's any doubt about the answer 
to that question. It's very obvious, and let me say it's 
obvious on the basis of my experience. 
I recently retired as the presiding justice of 
Division I of the Second Appellate District Court of Appeal 
in Los Angeles. I have a record of 20 years on the bench, 
15 of which is on the Superior Court of Los Angeles County; 
and the last five years, on the appellate court. So I 
speak from a background of my experience in the law of 
the 20 years of being a judge. 
I don't think anybody can rationally read the 
decisions of the US Supreme Court, the decisions of the 
California Supreme Court, without concluding that the exclu-
sionary rule is constitutionally required. And that being 
so, it is to say that it's capable of abolition by the 
Legislature as simply wishful thinking. The Legislature 
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1 may act, but there isn't any question in my mind that the 
2 California Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court would 
3 declare any attempt to modify the exclusionary rule as 
4 the courts have designed it as being contrary to law. 
5 I note that your staff presentation is indicated. 
6 Well, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment against 
7 unreasonable search and seizure and the requirement that 
8 warrant be issued upon probable cause to say what should 
9 be the remedy. It is true there is nothing that says that. 
10 There is nothing in the US Constitution that says there's 
11 a right of privacy, either. But nevertheless, the US 
12 Supreme Court has said it's in there. So the constitution 
13 is what our courts say it is. And they have said that. 
14 It's the constitutional requirement that if a defendant 
15 has been convicted through the use of illegally seized 
16 evidence, for example, that that is a violation not only 
17 of the Fourth Amendment, but a violation of the Fourteenth 
18 Amendment, if you're dealing with the states. 
19 Let me -- I can just point out two cases fairly 
20 not all that recent, either, which makes it very clear 
21 to me that this is a constitutional interpretation. Let's 
l2 take, for example, the case of Rochin vs. California 
23 in 1952 in which the police saw the defendant swallow some 
24 capsules, and then they proceeded to try to choke it out 
25 of him by the throat. They didn't succeed, they then carried 
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1 him to a hospital and asked the doctors there to pump his 
2 stomach out. The physicians did that, he vomited up the 
3 capsules which contained morphine. So he was convicted 
4 in the state court of illegal possession of morphine. And 
5 what did the US Supreme Court say? That that conviction 
6 had been obtained through the introduction of illegally 
7 obtained evidence. And what did it violate? The due process 
8 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Now that's something 
9 that you cannot overlook. 
10 Initially, the Fourth Amendment against search 
11 and seizure was not looked upon as applicable to the states. 
12 But take the Rochin case. It makes it quite clear that 
13 a conviction now obtained by the use of evidence which 
14 is held to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment is now 
15 also in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
16 Amendment. 
17 Now the Fourteenth Amendment doesn't say anything 
18 about what the remedies for violation of due process is. 
19 You read the Fourteenth Amendment. All it says is that: 
20 "No state shall deny to any person 
21 the right to life, liberty, o~ property 
22 without due process of law." 
23 Now it doesn't tell us what is a remedy for a 
24 state's invasion of one's rights. But the decisions make 
25 quite clear that the remedy such as the Rochin 
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6 
1 is that you simply must reverse the conviction, because 
2 it's a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. So that 
3 the argument that there's nothing specific about a remedy 
4 is simply meaningless. 
5 Take another case. I would refer briefly to 
6 a 1969 case. The Chimell vs. California which dealt 
7 with a search of the premises without a warrant in a house. 
8 The defendant had been arrested elsewhere. The police 
9 seized prooerty which had been found to have been taken 
10 in a prior burglary. And he was prosecuted for this prior 
11 burglary. And again, we have the court declaring that 
12 that search and seizure of the fruits of a prior burglary, 
13 which the police didn't know anything about, constituted 
14 a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and it was also carried 
15 into the Fourteenth. And I quote specifically what the 







"The scope of the search was therefore 
unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. And the petition of this 
conviction cannot stand." 
I c~ll your attention to the case similar to 
Vail vs. Louisiana, 1970 case in which the heroin 
23 the narcotic was seized in the defendant's house and declared 
24 to be an unlawful search. The Louisiana courts also consider d 
25 that there was no invalidity with respect to this particular 
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1 search. But the US Supreme Court did not go along with 
2 all the courts of Louisiana. And there again, what the 
3 US Supreme Court said in this case was: 










tutional error --" and I'm quoting. "-- in 
admitting into evidence the fruits of 
the illegal search." 
On the face of those cases, I simply see no basis 
for anyone saying the legislature can adopt an alternative 
solution such as some sort of civil action against the 
police officers who engaged in this illegal conduct. 
Now I'm not discussing at all, and I don't think 
the comittee should be concerned with what constitutes 
14 illegal search. It seems to me what you're concerned with 
15 here is assuming that the courts say that a particular 
16 search and a particular seizure of evidence which forms 
17 the basis of the exclusionary rule, once it's decided to 
18 be illegal, then what is the remedy? And the remedy, as 
19 I say, is quite clear. The California courts are no differen 
20 from the US Supreme Court. 
21 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: May I interrupt? 
JUDGE JEFFERSON: Yes. 
23 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: You say the remedy is clear, 
24 and that is to exclude the evidence 
25 JUDGE JEFFERSON: No, I'm going beyond that. 
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1 The remedy is clear that the conviction based upon that 
2 illegal evidence must be reversed. That's exactly what 
3 they said in the three cases I've mentioned to you. 
4 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: The purpose, then, in keeping 
5 out the evidence, then, is to deter this type of conduct 
6 in the future. 
7 JUDGE JEFFERSON: Oh, that's one purpose. But 
8 you cannot single out, as far as I am concerned, the one 
9 purpose. The courts have said to justify their interpretatio~ 
10 of the constitution as one of the reasons that it will 
11 deter illegal conduct by the police. Now clearly, the 
12 Supreme Court of the United States, California Supreme 
13 Court, could have interpreted the constitution otherwise. 
14 But they didn't see fit to do so. But that's not the only 
15 reason I think, and this one, the California Supreme Court 
14 has made quite clear, that they are equally concerned with 
17 the reason that the courts should not be a partner in illegal 
18 conduct. 
19 The integrity of the court is equally as important 
20 as the deterrent of illegal police conduct. So that when 
2 1 you have a court saying that the court should not sit idlely 
22 by, and when it sees that evidence has been obtained illegal! , 
23 and you've got illegal police conduct, take for example 
24 the police conduct in Rochin. It was particularly obnoxiou 
25 in the choking out or trying to choke out a man's material 
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1 that he swallowed. While you take conduct such as police 
2 beating a man and getting a confession out of him. If 
3 courts are going to sit back and say, "Well, there's a 
4 remedy like a civil lawsuit, but nevertheless we will permit 
5 and help his conviction alopg by letting this evidence 
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CHAIRMAN McVITTIE .: But ~sn't it a fact that I 
times the officJ r does : not I 1' that his conduct many rea 1ze 




JUDGE JEFFERSON: No doubt about that. And that 
i 
13 is when the second reason i~ equally as important as the 
14 first. And that's why the California Supreme Court has 
15 said it does not consider the pure deterrence as the only 





CHAIID-1AN McVITTIE,: Peter Jensen has a question. 
MR. JENSEN: Justice Jefferson, but to focus 
19 this, hasn't the US Supreme Court based its rationale for 
20 the exclusionary rule on a different basis in the California 
21 Supreme Court? I mean, you're focusing on both the integrity 
22 of the court and the d'e-t:errence of illegal police conduct. 
23 Hasn't the United States Supreme Court somewhat different 
24 than the California Court on that basis? 
25 JUDGE JEFFERSON: · The US Supreme Court, it is 
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1 true, has emphasized the deterrence. But nevertheless, 
2 it -- to me, the emphasis is immaterial. Once the court 
3 says, as it did in Vail vs. Louisiana, that a conviction 
4 that has been obtained by the use of illegal conduct, violate 
5 one's due process rights. So it doesn't make any difference 
6 what your analysis is as to what is back of i t . 
7 I personally feel that the California court is 
8 right in saying that the integrity of the court system 
9 of not being a party in illegal conduct is equally as impor-
10 tant as the background of saying whether we deter police 
11 conduct. The fact remains that whether it's a deterrent 
12 or not, once a defendant's rights have been affected, if 
13 you were to permit this type of thing. 
14 There is no doubt, I think, when the police tried, 
15 for example, in wholesale stopping of automobiles and searchi g. 
16 They in good faith could have believed, "Yeah, we should 
17 have been able to do that." I'm sure that when police 
18 will stop a black, say in Beverly Hills or in San Marino, 
19 and there's no basis other than blacks don't live there 
10 very much, and to stop him and want to search him so as 
21 to say, "You must be up to no good to be here in the first 
22 place," and want to search. And he can say, well, I'm 
23 in good faith. The blacks don't come to this section, 
24 they don't live here. So if I see a car riding around 
25 in a particular area that's lilly white, why can't I search? 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE, SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 
TELEPHONE (916) 383-3601 
0 
11 
I Or at least I'm in good faith, and if I find, search the 
2 man, pat down for weapons, and otherwise find he's carrying 
3 some contraband, then on this theory of deterrence, he's 
4 acted in good faith. And you'd say then that man's convictio~ 
5 ought to stand. But look what it's doing to the rights 
6 of people. 
7 If you don't have this exclusionary rule, the 
8 police could just decide we want to stamp out crime; the 
9 best way to do it is let's make a wholesale search of every 
10 house in the neighborhood. It doesn't make any difference. 
I t We know we say certain areas are called high crime areas. 
12 The supreme court has said well, that you cannot use to 
13 any great extent. If you see someone in the area, you 
14 have a right to search. But if you don't have the exclusiona y 
15 rule, and police then feel they are acting in good faith, 
16 and the best way to stamp out crime is let's just search 
17 every automobile, every house. 
18 And then this will bring me to the second, about 
19 the commentary. I have a hunch, I'm not sure, but it sounds 
20 like it could be a colleague of mine, Justice Flemming, 
21 who has written that. And I take total and complete issue 
22 with him on it. The theory that we pay a great price for 
23 people being turned loose. All these people aren't being 
24 turned loose, that's a lot of hogwash. It's not based 
25 upon facts, it's not based upon any legitimate study. Look 
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1 at the study that was made of the federal deal by the commit-
2 tee for Senator Kennedy. That study doesn't show that 
3 there is any wholesale violation of people's rights, and 
4 that they are being turned loose. I can't give you the 
5 figures, but over the last five years I wouldn't begin 
6 to say the number of cases that have come up to our courts, 
1 the appellate courts, in the way we have had to rule upon 
8 was there an illegal search and seizure? I would say probabl~ 
9 in 95 percent of the cases in which the trial courts have 
10 said there's not illegality, we have sustained them. The 
11 ones that are declared to have been an illegal search are 
12 clearly in the minority. And that doesn't necessarily 
13 mean that a person is going to go free. I can remember 
14 three or four cases, as I think about it, in which we held 
15 it was an illegal search. The case went back, retried, 
16 ·and the man found guilty in legally obtained evidence. 
17 And in some cases, he entered a plea of guilty. And I 
18 just don't know what the figures are, but certainly I don't 
19 believe that there are any figures which will show that 
20 the majority of cases in which an illegal search had been 
21 held to be that way by the court. But the result has been 
22 that person goes free. 
23 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Excuse me, Judge. Assemblyman 
24 Harris has a question. 
25 JUDGE JEFFERSON: Yes. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Yes. I want to ask, I under-
stand your comments, Justice Jefferson, relative to the 
constitutional requirement of the exclusionary rule. But 
I was wondering if you could comment on whether or not 
you feel that the exclusionary rule is completely beyond 
the purview of the legislative process, or is the Legislature 
empowered in your opinion to define, or to narrow the scope 
of the exclusionary rule, or is it something that is complete y 
within the purview of the judiciary, and beyond each case? 
JUDGE JEFFERSON: I think it's completely within 
the purview of the judiciary, because we are dealing with 
the interpretation of the constitution. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: But it's not defined in 
the constitution. 
JUDGE JEFFERSON: No, it's not defined. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Couldn't the Legislature 
define it and the courts determine whether or not that 
defintion is constitutional? 
JUDGE JEFFERSON: Oh, yes. You could do that, 
but all I'm saying is once you do it, I know the answer, 
I think. And that is the supreme court would say it's 
unconstitutional. 
For example, suppose the Legislature were to 
say that we would consider any search by an officer who 
in good faith thinks he ought to search a man, whether 
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1 he has cause or not, should be deemed valid. Or for example, 
2 suppose you were to say if a man is arrested in Monterey 
3 and he lives in San Francisco, that the police would have 
4 the right, then, to search his residence no matter how 
5 far distant from that it is. Yet the courts have said 
6 that the only reasonable search that's incident to an arrest 
7 is of his person and within the area of his reach to get 
8 hold of a weapon, et cetera. That you simply cannot then 
9 go to his house a few miles away, 150 miles away and search. 
10 Now suppose the Legislature were to say, "Well, 
11 we think there's nothing wrong with that." I would say 
12 the supreme court, the Supreme Court of California and 
13 the US Supreme Court would say that exceeds the province 
14 of the Legislature in trying to define what constitutes 
15 an unreasonable search, and so limit it. 
16 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Can the Legislature at all 
17 impact, then, in your opinion on the exclusionary rule? 
18 Or-- in other words, I'm really trying to get at 
19 JUDGE JEFFERSON: I would say instead of impacting 
20 in the sense of trying to abolish it or modify it, that 
21 you can make additional remedies available. 
22 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: For example? 
23 JUDGE JEFFERSON: In an effort to try to keep 
24 the police from violating that rule. 
25 Well, it would not supplant it, but suppose you 
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1 give an additional remedy of, let's say, a civil lawsuit. 
2 That might then make police departments more careful in 
3 their training, because of the possibility of the additional 
4 liability apart from the exclusion. 
5 There may be others. I wouldn't want to try 
6 to point out what could or could not be done, except I 
7 am sure that whatever is attempted, it still will be up 
8 to the court to determine what is unreasonable search and 
9 seizure, or what constitutes that kind of conduct which 
10 basically violates a sense of justice so as to constitute 
11 a violation of due process of law. 
12 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: One last question. Would 
13 you say in your opinion that the exclusionary rule is suffi-
14 ciently well defined so that law enforcement personnel 
15 know when they are within or without the exclusionary rule? 
16 JUDGE JEFFERSON: I think for the most part they 
17 do. Obviously they can make a mistake, everybody can. 
18 · But I think the--
19 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: But you mean the court has 
20 defined it to the extent it's clear? 
21 JUDGE JEFFERSON: I believe the court has defined 
22 it to the extent that in most cases the police know what 
23 they are able to do. But what my experience indicates, 
24 as I read the transcripts, is the police can get lazy. 
25 And instead of getting a warrant, for example, take the 
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1 chance on making an arrest and saying, "Well, maybe the 
2 defendant won't attack it, or maybe it can be upheld." 
3 I believe the decisions have sufficiently clarified and 
4 defined when a warrant is necessary, when it isn't, or 
5 the exceptions so that for the most part they know. 
6 Now there obviously are borderline cases in which 
7 the police can't tell, and nobody knows until the courts 
8 decide that particular case. But legislation can't solve 
9 that any more than the case-by-case method of the courts. 
10 So that your legislation would just simply open up another 
11 door for the courts to have to determine have you attempted 
12 by the legislation to get into and cross over into our 
13 division of powers. 
14 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
15 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Justice, if there was a, 
16 let's say, a statewide licensing system of peace officers 
17 so that there could be some type of a sanction against 
18 the officer who did improperly obtain evidence, then could 
19 there be greater consideration given to allowing the illegal 
20 evidence to be used at the criminal trial? 
21 JUDGE JEFFERSON: I don't believe so, because 
22 I can go back and give you the instances. It wouldn't 
23 make any difference what the sanction is. If the evidence 
24 has been seized illegally, as the court has defined what 
25 constitutes a reasonable search, I don't believe the Supreme 
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Court of the US is going to back up from its idea, if that 
evidence has been illegally obtained, that then you have 
convicted a man in violation of his due process rights. 
And to me, it wouldn't make a bit of difference as to what 
the sanction against the police would be, because we are 
dealing with an invasion by the government on a defendant's 
right of privacy, which in California, and even more impor-
tant, probably under the Federal Constitution, because 
California now has an explicit right of privacy to the 
individual. Whereas the US Supreme Court has simply had 
to read it into the Federal Constitution without regard 
to what the constitution says. And then you have to further 
consider that a state court -- and California has been 
one of the foremost -- is able to incorporate its constitu-
tional provisions similar to the federal, and give any 
party greater rights under the State Constitution than 
what the US Constitution would give. And we have case 
after case in which our supreme court has said, "As far 
as we are concerned, our constitution is to be interpreted 
the way we see it, and if it gives greater rights, it is 
permissible under our dual federal and state system." So 
I just don't think you can get around the fact that we 
have tried to provide additional sanctions will in any 
way get our supreme court in California, or US Supreme 
Court to change its view. 
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1 Now I might -- or at least you cannot have --
2 the legislation by itself isn't going to solve it. If 
3 you are able to get the supreme court to back off and begin 
4 interpreting the constitution in a different way, then 
5 I think we can see a change. But I'm not sure that legisla-
6 tion by the Legislature will. at all affect the way the 
7 US Supreme Court is going to look at the due process clause 
8 of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor do I believe that legislatur~ 
9 will affect the way our California Supreme Court will look 
10 at an interpretation of its own constitution with respect 
11 to the exclusionary rule. 
12 One of the reasons I am going back to the first 
13 point as to what the exclusionary rule is founded upon, 
14 is we do have in California specific instances where the 
15 California Supreme Court has said we are adopting this 
16 exclusionary rule out of our powers of concern, and our 
17 powers of direction over the lower court system. Now they 
18 have said that in several instances. But when it comes 
19 to the exclusionary rule for excluding illegally obtained 
20 evidence, they have not said that they based it specifically 
21 on the constitutional provisions, Federal Constitution, 
22 and the State Constitution. 
23 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you, Justice. Thank 
24 you very much. 
25 JUDGE JEFFERSON: Thank you very much for permittinc 
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me to appear. 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Next we do have District 
Attorney John Van De Kamp from Los Angeles County. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee, first of all let me just express my thanks to 
you for holding this hearing. The exclusionary rule is 
a hot topic today. I think discussions of this nature 
tend to bring to the fore many problems that prosecutors 
are having with it, and I think to generate the kind of 
controversy that hopefully will boil out of itself some 
changes. 
'I think you postulated 'the question to us today in 
a rather ball form. That is, you talk about whether or 
not it's capable of abolition. I think most of us who 
work as prosecutors understand the value of the rule in 
some instances, in that we see it on a day to day basis, 
and we find that the rule has been used in a neat axe approach, 
and it needs some substantial change. And that's why I'm 
here today representing not only myself at my office, but 
also the California DA's Association. 
As to your first question, "Is the exclusionary 
rule constitutionally required?" I think there's a simple 
answer to that. And that is as long as the courts say 
so. Twenty-five years ago in our state, or thereabouts, 
we did not have an exclusionary rule. A number of years 
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1 later of course, it was mandated by federal court development , 
2 and yet at the same time as Justice Jefferson has just 
3 so well articulated, we have substantial differences between 
4 the California Supreme Court and that of the United States 
5 Supreme Court. And indeed if there's one thing that brings 
6 us here today, it's the fact how the exclusionary rule 
7 is being implemented. Differences vary substantially from 
8 state to state, and from federal jurisdiction to local 
9 jurisdiction. 
10 Indeed, one of the cases that you will hear quoted 
11 today is Williams, a case out of the Fifth Circuit, where 
12 just the other day a majority of the appellate court in 
13 that Fifth Circuit voted for a good faith exception to 
14 the exclusionary rule by a vote of 13 to 11. 
15 The second question: 11 Is the judicial procedure 
16 capable of abolition by the legislative branch? 11 Well, 
17 I think Justice Jefferson probably put his finger on it. 
18 I think the reaction that he says would occur probably 
19 will occur, certainly in the California Supreme Court today, 
20 given the present situation. Yet I would refer this body 
21 to the well known dissent by Justice Burger in Bivens vs. 
22 Six Unknown Federal Narcotic Agents, written a number of 
23 years ago, but it's often cited in this debate in which 
24 he said, page 641: 
25 11 That reasonable and effective 
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substitutes can be formulated if Congress 
would take the lead," as for example in 1946 
in the Federal Tort Claims Act. He said: 
"I see no insuperable obstacle to 
the elimination of the suppression doctrine 
if Congress would provide some meaningful 
and effective remedy against unlawful 
conduct by government officials." 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: But John, even if Congress 
did take action, as Justice Jefferson pointed out, you 
would still have to have the majority of the supreme court 
to uphold that Congressional action. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Absolutely. And that's where 
I think he's right, and I'm not quarreling with him. Because 
I think the court will have the final say. And ye~ I tend 
to think that the United States Supreme Court, given the 
right kind of substitute or alternative, today might find 
a majority that will approve the Williams good faith test, 
or it might approve a level of sanctions that might provide 
a capable alternative. 
I come here today to talk to you about an alterna-
tive which is not really an ultimate panacea for the exclusio ar~ 
rule, but is an attempt to try to bring a greater level 
of certainty to the rule in California. Our rule, of course, 
is adopted in People vs. Cahan many, many years ago. And 
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1 it's very interesting, and I will get to this in a second, 
2 how many of the hopes of Cahan decision writers have simply 
3 not been met in the State of California. They set in 
4 writing their opinion many years ago, Justice Trainer wrote 
5 that opinion, in a case which I might say was a flagrant 
6 violation of the defendant's rights where there were unauthor 
7 ized forcible entries into homes, and it's one of those 
8 cases, sort of like Roc'hi~, which insults I think the 
9 mentality and humanity of most people. But in adopting 
10 the exclusionary rule in this case, the court said: 
11 "We are not unmindful of the contention 
12 of the federal exclusionary rule has been 
13 arbitrary in its application, and has 
14 introduced needless confusion into the 
15 law of criminal procedure." 
16 Theywent on to say that that would not happen 
17 here. They said we don't have to follow the federal cases. 
18 And they said that: 
19 "The federal cases indicate needless 






searches and reject them. Further, the 
development of the exclusionary rule need 
not introduce confusion into the law. 
Instead, it opens the door into the develop-
ment of workable rules governing searches 
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2 I think this is where Justice Jefferson and I 
3 part company. I would suggest that we might have a neutral 
4 law school professor prepare a car procedure situation. 










area of criminal law know is fraught with all kinds of 
complexities where you have decision after decision, change 
after change coming from our appellate courts, and see 
whether or not given a spot situation whether he or anyone 
else, I'm not singling him out, could deal with a decision 
in a fairly constitutional way to make sure that that search 
and seizure would be upheld. I don't think he could, because 
the cases are just too numerous, and the problems are simply 
too complex in that area. I think anybody who saw 60 Minutes 
15 a number of months ago and saw that little car search that 
16 they simulated there gets an idea of how technical our 
17 rules have become. 
18 Cahan also predicted that where the search and 
l9 seizure may involve only minor intrusions of privacy, are 
20 a result of good safe mistakes in judgment on the part 
21 of the police officer, there is no reason why if the exclu-
22 sionary rule is adopted, appropriate exceptions could not 
23 be made to govern these latter situations. 
24 Well, I just have to tell you that I don't think 
25 the goals of Cahan, which were aimed primarily at detterence, 
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Bell's Compendium, go to some of the seminars, you go to 
the classes that are put on for defense lawyers and prosecu-
tors, you look at our search warrant manual, you get an 
idea of how complex this situation is. 
It is my opinion, and that of many prosecutors 
in California, that the goals simply have not been met, 
and that here in California the exclusionary rule has failed 
to live up to the expectations of those who framed it. 
It is and has been of questionable effectiveness in deterring 
unreasonable police conduct, the rules governing search 
and seizure have become so complex and change so frequently 
that no law enforcement officer can reasonably be expected 
14 to know them in their entirety. That's also true with 
15 respect to the laws governing arrests, confessions, line 
16 ups, where the exclusionary rule also comes into play. 
17 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Excuse me, Mr. Jensen would 
18 like to ask a question. 
19 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes. 
20 MR. JENSEN: I'm wondering, you're starting to 
21 focus on a little different area than Justice Jefferson 
22 did. Is that the only basis for the exclusionary rule, 
23 is deterring illegal police conduct? We haven't clearly 
24 drawn that distinction. Apparently there is a difference 
25 in the rule between the US Supreme Court and California. 
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1 MR. VAN DE KAMP: That's right. 
2 MR. JENSEN: Do you ascribe to it, the only purpose 
3 of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct? 
4 There is no sense of the integrity of the court in accepting 
5 
6 
this illegally seized evidence? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think there have been decisions 
7 from both the supreme court of the earlier days and from 
the California Supreme Court which point to the standpoint 8 
9 of judicial integrity as one of the bases for the exclusionar1 




talking about judicial integrity, you're also talking about 
fording into the development of truth, which has always 
been an important function of the taking of testimony at 
14 a criminal trial. And indeed, you are obviously closing 
15 the door to truthful probative testimony when you do it. 
16 And what I'm saying today is suggesting that there are 
17 very significant offsetting reasons why we should return 
18 to truth, and why indeed what we've done in the past 25 
19 years has to a certain extent brought our courts into certain 
20 disrepute. 
21 MR. JENSEN: Even if the truth is arrived at 
22 through the seizure of evidence illegally? The truth is 
23 more important? 
24 
25 tion. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think it depends on the situa-
I just want to point out that I am not here to support 
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1 the notion of pumping out stomachs of people, taking those 
2 kinds of activities. But I am talking about the overwhelming 
3 number of cases which are borderline cases, gray area cases 
4 where there has been a technical distinction which has 
5 robbed the court of getting at the truth in particular 
6 cases. And I want to make one point --
7 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: All right. Mr. Knox and 
8 Mr. Harris, if you're through, Peter. 
9 MR. JENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes. 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What about the situation where 
11 the officer plants the stuff on the defendant while illegally 
12 breaking into the house? 
13 MR. VAN DE RAMP: Where he plants it on the defen-
14 dant? 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Yeah. There have been a lot 
16 of cases like that. 
17 MR. VAN DE RAMP: Well, I don't know what advantage 
18 that kind of evidence can be used. I mean I --
19 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well, if the officer can break 
10 into your house or break into a car without a search warrant, 
21 and then you know, the reason I raise the question, as 
22 you said, we are searching for the truth. But the way 
23 you frame it, the truth is always what the officer says, 
14 it's never what the defendant says; isn't that true? 
25 MR. VAN DE RAMP: No, no. And I can see -- I 
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point to jurys, courts,that everyday have to make those 
decisions to who's telling the truth. And there are cases 
I can show you --
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: The contest isn't really equal, 
is it Mr. Van De Kamp? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Not completely equal, but it's 
not as one sided or black/white as you might suggest. And 
I can take you into our court system and watch in a daily 
basis about some of the decisions that are made by jurors 
and judges on that score where policemen are disbelieved. 
Again, let me get back to this. I am not 
in the case you have framed, you see, that would be I think 
a bad faith intentional violation which would be unreasonable 
on its face which should relate in exclusion. I would 
suggest if that somebody had followed in the Williams case. 
But I'm not talking about cases like that. Obviously, 
if you had that kind of case, you couldn't get a conviction 
anyway. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What's a typical fact situation 
you would like to see removed by the Legislature? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: The usual traffic stop where 
they perhaps open a container, issue where you make a certain 
type of an arrest where I think you should be able to search 
the body of the particular person. I can go through a 
whole series of federal/state distinctions which I would 
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1 like to address for a second, because it gets me to the 
2 point I would like to make. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What's the language you would 
4 like to see inserted in the code? 
5 MR. VAN DE KAMP: What I would like to do, and 
6 I'm late in getting there, is suggest an amendment to the 
7 California Constitution which says that: 
8 "Notwithstanding any other provision 
9 of this Constitution or California Penal 
10 Code Section 1538.5, evidence shall not 
11 be excluded or limited for any purpose 
12 in any legal proceeding except as provided 
13 by other statute." 
14 That is, the Legislature after a sense of rulemakin~ 
15 like hearing or whatever, could set rules that go beyond 
16 the Federal Constitution, or as required by the United 
17 States Constitution. The point being to get away from 
18 the variation between federal and state law, and the needless 
19 complexity that that tends to bring. And to give the rule 
20 setting authority to the State Legislature if it wishes 
2 1 to use it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well, if your amendment passed, 
23 what kind of a bill would you like to see adopted by the 
24 Legislature? 
25 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Well, first of all, we-would 
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1 like to see that to get out of the Legislature and go on 
2 the ballot here in California. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: No, but let's say that's now 
4 the Constitution of the State of California. What kind 
5 of language would you like to see in the code? What sort 
6 of pass would you give the police to search people's 
7 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I would think the language 
8 in the Williams case, which provides a good safe reasonable 
9 belief test to take you out from under. 
10 For example, I'll just give you a hypothetical, 
11 we have had cases in California which say that if an officer 
12 goes out and ·makes an arrest and seizure as a result of 
13 an ordinance then in effect, and the ordinance is found 
14 to be unconstitutional, though he may have acted entirely 
15 appropriately, then the evidence has to be thrown out. 
16 Now what kind of deterrent value that has, I don't know. 
17 I would like to see that good safe rule apply to a situation 
18 like that. I'd like to see that rule apply to search warrant 
19 situations. And Lowell Jensen who will speak after me 
20 has some proposed legislation. He is going to talk more 
21 about legislation than I am, that would say that where 
22 a search warrant has been issued, and the officer goes 
23 out and properly executes it, then that evidence shall 
24 not be withheld, even though there may be a question as 
25 to whether or not the judge or magistrate who issued the 
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1 warrant might have been in error in issuing the warrant. 
2 Clearly in that kind of a case, the officer acted appropriate y 
3 in going to that magistrate, in getting the warrant, and 
4 I assume what he has said is honest and reliable, not falsi-
5 fied. Why should he be penalized because he did the right 
6 thing? We are trying to encourage officers to get search 
7 warrants. And over the years, that's one thing that's 
8 happened. More and more warrants are being obtained through 
9 our court system than ever before. It makes no sense, 
10 does it, to impose the exclusionary rule in that kind of 
11 case except on the quote, judicial integrity doctrine. But 
12 certainly, on the detterence doctrine it does not. 
13 Getting back to the judicial integrity doctrine, 
14 I think there's a balance issue, truth versus the integrity 
15 of the court. And I think you also have to throw into 
16 that will the refusal to place that evidence into court 
17 really cast the courts into even greater disrepute, because 
18 I think the exclusionary rule and what it has done in some 
19 outlandish cases has probably done more than anything else 
10 in this state to bring political pressures on the court. 
21 Because the rule has become almost Alice in Wonderland 
11 like. 
23 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Harris? 
24 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Would you add to that equation 
15 Mr. Van De Kamp, the rights of individuals in terms of 
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the Fourth Amendment, and then y.ou are basically saying 
overall you would in fact add to the rights of the defendant 
in terms of privacy, and then of course the Fourth Amendment, 
due process and protection types of arguments that we can 
in fact do a balancing act relative to the probative value 
of getting at the truth, and the extent to which individuals' 
rights have been violated in the course of a criminal investi 
gation, arrest, or whatever. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: I would hope that's the direction 
we move in, because we find that there's a disproportionate 
sanction. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: You're saying the right 
of privacy is not absolute? 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: No. I don't think so. And 
I think in this area we need to start talking much more 
about balancing than we have before in the past. And again, 
I want to make it clear I am exempting any bad faith unreason 
able types of searchs at the outset. But we are talking, 
as I say, in many areas. Search warrants are a good example, 
the unconstitutional ordinance where it has -- should not 
be utilized as it has. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Well, if you agree with 
Justice Jefferson, and I am inclined to do so, that if 
the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, then 
it would seem to me that the real problem you have is probabl' 
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1 much more political than legal. I mean, you're talking 
2 about changing the court, you're talking about trying to 
3 get some interpretation that will allow you to bypass this 
4 constitutional requirement. And you know, you have either 
5 that or as you suggest, a constitutional amendment. But 
6 I still think it's questionable in terms of its impact. 
7 I just don't know how you get beyond the constitu-
8 tiona! requirement to the point that you're trying to get 
9 to, and I am wondering what you are talking about in terms 
10 of legislative remedies. I don't know how you can get 
11 there. I know where you're trying to go, but I'm not sure 
12 you can get there from here. 
13 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Well, Lowell has some ideas 
14 on that. I'm not going to steal all --
15 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: That's not what I'm getting 
16 at. 
17 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Again, I want to emphasize 
18 the one thing we can do is a constitutional amendment here 
19 that makes -- that provides recourse strictly to the Federal 
20 Constitution and the United States Supreme Court. 
21 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: And the State Legislature. 
22 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes, that's right. 
2! ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What they want to do is they 
24 figure they can stampede the State Legislature. 
25 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: They probably can. 
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1 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: They can raise all this gun 
2 money and defeat judges with deputy DA's, and they figure 





ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Very reasonable argument. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I can understand that. I 
can understand their point of view. I just want to make 
8 it clear there are enough people around to prevent them 
9 from doing it. 
10 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Van De Kamp, if the propose 
11 constitutional amendment were enacted, it would require 
12 the courts, then, to follow the rulings of the federal 
13 courts in terms of search and seizure. But times do change, 
14 and supposing the federal court then became a liberal court 
15 once again? Granted, now it's more conservative, perhaps 
16 in the California court. But suppose we return again to 
17 a Warren era and the federal rulings were more liberal 
18 than the California court? 
19 MR. VAN DE KAMP: That couldn't happen, because 
20 the California court would have to follow suit. We are 





can beyond, as they have in our cases that I have cited 
in the testimony that I will turn in to you for filing, 
which I have not read in haec verba today. But they cannot 
undercut the United States Supreme Court, because if they 
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1 do, that case is going to go up there and they will get 
2 reversed. 
3 CHAI~urn McVITTIE: So if the federal court became 
4 more liberal, would that liberalize the rules of the Californ'a 
5 court otherwise established? 
6 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes, that's right. 
7 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: So there's two edges to the 
8 knife, then. 
9 MR. VAN DE KAMP: No, I think that edge is already 
10 there. No question about it. 
11 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: All right. You're saying 
12 the probability of the Supreme Court of the United States 
13 being more liberal than the California Supreme Court is 
14 very remote? 
15 
16 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: The next president will appoint 
17 probably five members of the Supreme Court of the United 
18 States. 
19 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: He's right. 
20 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think the present court, 
21 with this Williams case would be a good example, or one 
22 of the cases that comes up in the Fifth Circuit rule, is 
23 very apt to be taken by the court, and we are apt to have 
24 a substantial modification of the exclusionary rule because 
15 of it. 
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1 You know, we often talk as liberal activists 
2 about experience lighting the way towards you know, wisdom 
3 and sound judgment. And yet, you know, what I would really 
4 like to ask you to do, and the supreme court, is to start 
5 focusing in and ask whether it really works. There is 
6 an old adage I learned long ago, "Nothing is so practical 
7 as good theory. 11 And you test what has happened in the 
8 last 25 years in terms of what Cahan suggested would happen: 
9 all wrong. It does not work that way. You are having 
10 a patchwork rule system made up by the different appellate 
11 districts, and even divisions of those districts. Something 
12 that is now unlearnable, and that. has to be turned around. . 
13 Somehow we have to have -- and the supreme court set about 
14 it in California itself, to set out really black letter 
15 rules. That might be a step forward. But they have never 
16 considered doing that. And I don't think they really under-
17 stand the dilemma posed by most law enforcement people 
18 working in our streets. 
19 Now let me just respond to one other thing. I 
20 know others wish to speak. You asked about the Controller 
21 General 'st report with respect to the impact of the search 
22 and seizqre law. Let me just say a couple of things about 
' 
2J that. First of all, that was a federal report dealing 
24 with federal cases. And while there are some federal drug 
25 cases, most federal violations are not apt to involve q~ite 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE. SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 
TELEPHONE (91 6) 383-3601 
36 
1 as many search and seizure problems as you might find at 
2 the state or local level. 
3 Second, we took a look at it in conjunction with 
4 our own office to try to figure out whether or not the 
5 study made a lot of sense. We ran it through our so called 
6 "Promise System" which is computerized management information 
7 system which attempts to give -- provide immediately the 
8 reasons for dismissals of cases, as well as tracking cases 
9 through. The best information that we could record is 
10 that it applied to about seven percent of the cases in 
11 some way or another. However, what the federal report 
12 did not do, nor can our "Promise System" do, is deal with 
13 the number of situations on the street where let's say 
14 the defendant was released because someone made a judgment, 
15 there may be an illegal search and seizure problem, or 
16 where an office in command might say "we are not going 
17 to send that case to the DA," because of that. There's 
18 a lot of activity which is effected at that level before 
19 you can even get into the process. On top of that, our 
20 people carne to the conclusion that there are probably a 
21 lot of other cases that don't get recorded. Where search 
22 and seizure cases do not get recorded, but where other 
23 codes are being used. 
24 In short, the estimate that they .-- again, that's 
25 a very wide ballpark -- is that from one-third to one-half 
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1 the cases we handle have search and seizure issues. Not 
2 all the cases get litigated, but it's to a far greater 
3 extent than was indicated in this federal report. And 
4 I would hope somebody sometime, and perhaps your committee 
5 may wish to fund a study to see what the real impact is 
6 at the local level. That might be very worthwhile. 
7 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Yes, Peter? 
8 MR. JENSEN: Mr. Van De Kamp, to have one-third 
9 to one-half as an issue, the issue is how many are adversely 
10 affected from, say your position because pf the Fourth 
11 Amendment exclusionary rule? I think even the Controller's 
12 report indicated there were much larger number than one-
13 fourth to one percent that had an issue. But what they 
14 said was when you filter that down, really very few of 
15 them were successful. You know, the issue was raised and 
16 it had no merit. 
17 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Well, there are different ways 
18 that it can have an impact. And I don't think this was 
19 studied. I am not saying I have the final answer on it, 
20 except I know they had undercounted and not done a complete 
21 and thorough job. Cases get reduced. An issue may not 
22 be complete dispositive, but it may result in a plea to 
23 a lesser charge, or it may result in a dismissal on other 
24 grounds. There are a lot of permeations to the problem 
25 which need to be studied, and again as I say, that's one 
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1 thing you might take a look at, as a couple committees 
2 have tried to do, just to see what the real impact is. 
3 MR. JENSEN: May I follow up, Mr. Chairman? 
4 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Yes. 
5 MR. JENSEN: One last question. In the case 
6 decided ih Bivens, didn't the .supreme court, Justice Burger 
7 indicate that it would be a mistake to abrogate the exclusion 
8 ary rule without a good alternative, because that would 
9 give the indication to the police that we were going to 
10 check this kind of conduct? So he suggested he would support 
11 an abrogation of the exclusionary rule if there was a viable 
12 alternative. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: That's right. I mentioned 
14 that because Justice Jefferson I think pointed out, maybe 
15 not intentionally so, that some of this is written on tablets 
16 in stone. That it's constitutionally required perhaps 
11 for all time. Justice Burger I think makes it very clear 
18 that there are adequate alternatives, that it would not 
19 be. Now that gets in a very difficult area, and I think 
20 you have touched on some of those in your discussion with 
21 him. What kind of sanctions, licensing, sanctions against 
22 the officer, sanctions against the department. There are 
23 great variations, and all of them have political problems. 
24 
25 
MR. JENSEN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Ullman? 
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1 ~~. ULLMAN: John, the committee has been told 
2 before that when ~n doubt, the police should get a warrant 
3 in order to get around some of those search and seizure 
4 problems. And Justice Jefferson alleged that part of the 
5 problem was just laziness in policework. 
6 How do you factor that into this good faith excep-
7 tion, when the police officer could have gotten around 
8 the problem by getting a warrant? 
9 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: It was one of the leading 
10 cases, I think it was in Alhambra, where they had him cold, 
11 and they had the time to get the warrant, and they were 
12 just too lazy to get it. And could have arrested some 
13 very serious drug dealers, and they all got off because 
14 of just sloppy policework. That happened before you took 
15 office, but in your jurisdiction. 
16 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I appreciate that. 
17 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: No, I mean we heard that case 
18 years ago. It's just frightening. These are real hard 
19 drug dealers that were doing some terrible things, and 
10 they had plenty of time, and the cops just wouldn't take 
21 the effort to get this jurisdictional thing, which they 
22 easily could have done. There was plenty of time to do 
23 it. 
24 MR. VAN DE KAMP: But you see, that takes you 
25 back to the good safe test. And that if they acted with 
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1 questionable faith but unreasonably, and certainly if they 
2 had time to get a warrant in a situation like that, that 
3 would be unreasonable. There is always that problem, and 
4 there is overwork. They have tremendous street problems 
5 to deal with in terms of volume. But there is a light 
6 year difference in the number of warrants that are obtained 
7 today, versus 10 to 20 years ago. 
8 MR. ULLMAN: So what you're saying is the ability 
9 to get a warrant is unreasonable per se, as far as the 
10 good faith test? 
11 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I'm not sure I understand the 
12 way you have postulated it. 
MR. ULLMAN: Assuming there is enough for probable 
14 cause for a search warrant, and the police officer searches 
15 without a warrant, the ability to get a warrant on time, 
16 would that make it in itself an unreasonable search under 
17 your good faith test? 
18 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Possibly, as long as it was 
19 clear that a warrant was obtainable and you should do it 
20 in that situation. I mean, you get into these closed container 
21 cases where you can search inside a car and where you cannot. 
22 ~rJhether you should be able to search a person physically 
23 after an arrest, and how far you can go. Clearly, black 
24 letter laws are needed in those areas, and then if they 
25 don't comply, I think you could say that it's unreasonable. 
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I ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Could I ask one final question? 
2 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Yes. 
3 ASSE~IDLYMAN KNOX: How many of these motions 
4 to suppress evidence succeed in your jurisdiction? 
5 MR. VAN DE KAMP: My guess is, and this is a 
6 recollection from figures I have seen months ago, is perhaps 
7 in a month you may get 25 to 30. 
8 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Out of how many? 
9 MR. VAN DE KAMP: These are the ones reported, 
10 I believe, in superior court. 
11 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I mean those that are successful 
12 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think of those that I saw 
13 reported, and I cannot say all of those are being reported, 
14 because of recordkeeping problems. But I would say it 
15 came out to somewhere between 35 and 45 percent. 
16 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Are successful? 
17 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes. 
18 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Now out of how many prosecutions 
19 MR. VAN DE KAMP: In a year, we will dispose 
20 of 15 to 17 thousand, 18,000 cases. 
21 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: So 45 to 30 a month for what? 




ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: So very small -- this is not 
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1 MR. VAN DE KAMP: Yes, sir. These are in superior 
2 court. 
3 ASSEMBLY~mN KNOX: This is not a serious cancer 
4 on prosecution in Los Angeles County? 
5 MR. VAN DE KAMP: The problem is in underreporting, 
6 though. It does not cover -- I'm talking about superior 
7 court. You still have motions that have been made in munici-
8 pal court, or prelims that are not recorded in the sense 
9 that I am talking about. Those cases that get up, there 
10 has already been some suppression. 
11 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you think this is a very 
12 serious disease of prosecution, that the public are not 
13 being prouected in a significant way, because of this rule? 
14 I am willing to concede that probably some guilty people 
15 go free as a cause of sloppy policework. 
16 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think there are cases where 
17 clearly justice is done. 
18 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: How many cases? 
19 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I am not going to give you 
20 a shotgun figure, because I cannot state it. 
21 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I am not demanding a shotgun 
22 figure. But it's obviously not the majority of cases, 
2J or even 10 percent of the cases? 
24 MR. VAN DE KAMP: No. But they -- it has an 
25 impact, of course as I said. I believe other ways on cases, 
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1 and that ' s --
2 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well those cases get the notice 
3 of the media, and then the DA takes a shot, and the police 
4 department takes a shot, and the court system and the Legis-
5 lature and everybody else takes a shot when somebody has 
6 pled guilty, right? Even though it might be less than 
7 one percent of the cases. So it's a political problem. 
8 MR. VAN DE KAMP : No , no . 
9 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: It's not a judicial problem, 
10 it's not a problem of protecting the public, it's a political 
11 problem. 
MR. VAN DE KAMP: That's where we disagree, because 
13 the overwhelming majority of these cases never see the 
14 light of prison. Occasional aboration of, you know. A 
15 clearly bad call and well publicized case does. 
16 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: No, I disagree with the supreme 
17 court on that one where the lady opened the trunk of the 
18 car, and what was that case? Agreed to open the trunk? 
19 Where it was her car and she clearly had the right to do 
20 it and allow the officers in, and they found other contraband 
21 not related to the arrest. I disagree with that case. 
22 But after all, I am not on the supreme court, and these 
23 cases I am going to disagree with now and then. But I 
24 thought that was a little far out, to be perfectly candid. 
25 But that's just ongoing work of the court. But the heat 
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1 is taken by committees such as this, DA's, police, and 
2 the courts. But it's not a significant cancer on law enforce 
3 ment in the state, in my judgment. 
4 MR. VAN DE KAMP: I think you can ask law enforce-
5 ment about that, and I think they will disagree with you. 
6 And I am going to ask you, because I have not, for reasons 
7 of time, gone through my testimony at a glance through 
8 it, because there are some cases cited that point out this 
9 distinction between federal and state decisionmaking, I 
10 think is an important notion that we are proposing today. 
11 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Fine. Thank you very much, 
12 John. 
13 Now according to the agenda we next have City 
14 Attorney Burt Pines from the City of Los Angeles. 
15 
16 
MR. ULLMAN: He's not here. 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: All right. Burt's not here. 
17 Next we have Mr. Lowell Jensen, District Attorney 
18 in and for the County of Alameda. 
19 For the record, we will take Mr. Van De Kamp's 
20 prepared remarks into the record as an exhibit in the brochur 
21 that will be published later. 
22 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
23 I have some remarks, also, that I would like to have handled 
24 the same. way. 
25 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Yes. For the purpose of 
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1 expediting the hearing today, since we did get started 
2 late, we will also take your prepared remarks and incorporate 
3 them into the record so that when the booklet is prepared, 




ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: In haec verba. 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: In haec verba? Fine. 
MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I am going to try to be merci-
8 fully brief. I appreciate the opportunity. The last time 
9 we talked about this was in Sacramento, and it's more benign 
10 in here. I appreciate the fact you have decided to have 
11 me here. 
12 I am going to pick up a little bit. Obviously, 
13 I agree with John Van De Kamp in toto, and I would -- I'm 
14 picking out a little bit on what we are talking about. 
15 I think it's interesting to 
16 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Excuse me. Do you support 
17 the concept of adopting the federal rule? Because if we 
18 did have a constitutional amendment in the California Consti-
19 tution, I assume we will be following the federal rules 
20 established by the federal courts. 
21 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I think, as John says, I 
22 think that's a given, that the Fourth Amendment will be 
23 required in California regardless of what the Supreme Court 
24 of California or the Legislature does. So we just operate 
25 on the fact that that's a given. The issue is what we 
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1 do as a legislature. But I think that it's important to 
2 observe that -- we're really not talking about doing away 
3 with the exclusionary rule. Maybe there are persons who 
4 talk about that, but the abrogation of the exclusionary 
5 rule, and I am sure there are some exponents of that, that 
6 you may hear from them. I don't come before you asking 
7 you to do that. I don't say that we are going to do away 
8 with the exclusionary rule. While I would tend to state 
9 it would not occur, that the courts would see to it that 
10 the exclusionary rule would remain. 
11 I think the real issue is the sweep of the exclusio~ary 
12 rule. What is it, rather than the fact that it's here. 
13 I think it is here, and I have no disagreement with that. 
14 I think the issues get down to what is the scope of it. 
15 And there are very significant differences between the 
16 US -- the present US Supreme Court interpretation of the 
17 Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and that which we see 
18 in California. And I think that's what we are really talking 
19 about. 
20 I was going to be more specific in saying that 
21 I think that the Legislature could pass laws and specifically 
22 amend 1538.5 and then realistically, what we're saying 
23 is if the courts will look and see whether they agree with 
24 it. 
25 ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: That's subsequent to a consti-
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1 tutional amendment? 
2 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: No, not at all. I think 
3 you can do that without a constitutional amendment. 
4 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: He's saying raise the issue 
5 and present it to the courts. 
6 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Let me give you a specific 
7 example of maybe how you get through that. That there 
s are areas we are talking to. John has mentioned the notion 
9 of the good faith circuit as an exception to the exclusionary 
10 rule. It's probably correct to say in California that's 
11 not in existence now. A good faith search is a violation 
12 of the exclusionary rule. And the question is could you 
13 pass -- amend 1538.5 to say that good faith searches are 
14 permitted in California? The issue would come down to 
15 whether or not the Fourth Amendment permitted that. And 
16 at least in the Fifth Circuit it would. And then would 
17 it be in violation of the California Constitution, or the 
18 interpretation of the California Constitution in effect 
19 on independent state grounds? 
20 To give you a specific example of an area where 
21 I think you could consider it as a subject matter of legisla-
22 tive wisdom, the sweep of the exclusionary rule is different 
23 in California in the sense that a vicarious exclusionary 
24 rule available in California, which is not available in 
25 the federal courts. That is, that a person may claim 
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1 the right that has been violated on another and be effective 
2 in terms of implementing the exclusionary rule in California. 
3 That's a very rare thing. I think there are only two states 
4 that have the so called vicarious exclusionary rule, and 
5 it's been pointed out, it's essentially a rule of standing. 
6 Do you have standing to raise the exclusionary rule? But 
7 that's essentially a very, very important part of the imple-
8 mentation of the exclusionary rule in California. 
9 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Mr. Jensen, I want to make 
10 sure I understand the fact situation you are talking about. 
11 That's where I own property that is identifiable 
12 to me, and it's in your house, and your house is unreasonably 
13 searched, and they find contraband? 
14 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: No. I will give you an example 
15 of what I mean. There could be fact situations that meet 
16 that standard area, but here's an example we had recently 
17 for a burlary: The police stopped a couple of young girls 
18 on the theory they are prostitutes one night, and then 
19 they go on and talk to them for awhile, and they are taken 
20 into custody, and they are found to be juvenile runaways. 
2 1 And it turns out they are prostitutes, and as a result 
22 of the questioning the pimp who got them started on this 
23 business, and engaged in some sexual conduct with them, 
24 some sexual abuse, is identified and picked up and prosecuted 
25 and we convicted him. And it goes on, and he goes over 
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and he says, well, the police were unlawful in · 
their stopping of those girls, that that detention was 
an unlawful detention. The court says, yes it was an unlaw-
ful detention, and that you may raise this. You have the 
standing to do so. You wouldn't have the standing in federal 
court, but you do have it in California under the interpreta-
tion of the exclusionary rule. So the case was thrown 
out. They are not permitted to testify. So the exclusionary 
rule is worked in a fashion that the victim is not permitted 
to testify against this particular pimp, because of the 
implementation of the exclusionary rule through a vicarious 
process. 
Now can you do something about that? That's 
the question to my mind. There is obviously a question: 
should you? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I don't want to get into your 
case completely, but they were read their Miranda rights, 
or were they put in an accusatory position, or were they 
just talking to them? 
MR. LOWELL JENSEN: They stopped them to find 
out what they were doing, and it was an unlawful detention. 
Because they didn't have a reason, or the court felt after 
looking at it, that it was an unlawful -- you can argue 
looking at it that it wasn't a lawful -- you could argue 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: That poisoned everything after 
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1 that? 
2 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Yes. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I see. How about the case 
4 I suggested where I have some contraband that I store at 
5 your house that's clearly identifiable with me, and they 
6 unreasonably search your house? Do I have, then, standing 
7 to say that your house was unreasonably searched? 
8 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: The question is whose right 
9 is violated, and the vicarious exclusionary rule would 
10 give you standing to raise the issue of the violation of 
11 another person's rights. So under that sequence, it may 
12 very well be that you have good standing to raise that 
u other rights. 
14 Now -- so my question is do you have the ability 
15 as legislatures to change that if you wanted to? Could 
16 you amend 1538.5 to take out the vicarious exclusionary 
17 rule? Now there is a case that does address this, and 
18 that's the Kaplan case. And the Kaplan case was --the 
19 issue involved was the notion of the exclusionary rule 
20 and whether or not the evidence code had changed that in 
21 some fashion. And the vicarious exclusionary rule in Califor ia 
22 generally, the basic case is the Martin case, and when 
23 the court considered this, they decided that the issue 
24 was not directly before them. But in a footnote, they 
25 said this conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to reach 
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1 defendants constitutional arguments, that the Martin rule 
as required by the search and seizure clause of the Californi 
3 Constitution. Nothing we say here, however, is meant to 
4 foreclose consideration of those issues when it is appropriat 
5 to do so. The issue's open. So the issue is open as to 
6 whether or not something could be done about this issue 
7 of vicarious exclusion. 
8 To me, that raises the question should the Legis-
9 lature take this on? That's a question of legislative 
10 judgment, or legislative wisdom as to whether or not you 
11 agree that the system in California should permit that 
12 kind of an exclusionary rule implementation. And as the 
13 Legislature, if you decide that is not a wise kind of way 
14 of implementing this exclusionary rule, I say pass an amend-
15 ment to 1538.5 and then we will find out whether or not 
16 the supreme court agrees with that, or not. As it has 
17 been pointed out, you will never find out unless the law 
18 comes into existence by legislative action. That addresses 
19 your wisdom. 
zo ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you have language to suggest 
21 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: We have some language. There 
lZ is a bill, AB 3339, I think was the number that the bill 
23 came under. 
24 
25 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Peter, do you have a question? 
MR. JENSEN: Well, it goes back to this fundamental 
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1 constitutional question. The California Supreme Court 
2 is saying there are. two phases for excluding this. The 
3 integrity of the court, we are sworn to uphold the constitu-
4 tion. This was gathered in violation of the constitution; 
5 therefore, we won't admit it. And it goes back to that 
6 issue of is the constitutional rule constitutionally mandated 
7 and if it is, both rationale are supported. And you are 
8 saying we ought to test that. 
9 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I'm saying it doesn't make 
10 any difference to the extent that you use the notion of 
11 the integrity of the judiciary as a basis for the exclusionar 
12 rule, and in effect an independent kind of ground in Califor-
13 nia. You still haven't solved the problem as to whether 
14 or not any specific implementation of the exclusionary 
15 rule is constitutionally mandated. 
16 One of the cases that dealt with that just recently 
17 I think that has been alluded to a couple times, is the 
18 notion that the officer makes an arrest based upon what 
19 is subsequently held to be unconstitutional ordinance. 
20 This case in San Francisco where this occurred, the Jennings 
21 case, I believe, and in that case the court specifically 
22 said that this is the integrity of the judiciary we are 
23 dealing with, because there were other cases that had dis-
24 cussed it in deterrence terms. And they said, "No, we 
25 think the integrity of the judiciary is involved here." 
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1 Now the federal rule is directly contra. Under 
2 a circumstance like that, it is no violation of the 
3 exclusionary rule. And to the extent the federal people 
4 feel that their integrity is involved, they are not offended 
5 by that. But the California Court of Appeals said that 
6 "we think that this violates the integrity of the court, 
7 and we are going to say exclusion." I think that's just 
8 a question of what the courts feel about it. Just like 
9 saying, "What is the constitution?" They are saying, "What 
10 is our integrity?" And I think that's an issue for the 
11 courts to make up their own mind. 
12 The interesting thing is in that case they went 
13 on to say that the real misconduct, if there is some miscon-
14 duct they are getting at, was legislative. The Legislature, 
15 if you really want to get down to it, misconducted themselves 
16 by passing this defective ordinance. And so that the 
17 exclusionary rule is used to deter legislative misconduct 
18 in that sense, if you want to carry it through that kind 
19 of analysis. That's gone a long way from the original 
20 notion of the exclusionary rule of deterring unlawful police 
21 conduct. We have come a long way. And I may ask you what 
22 are the sanctions you are going to put up for the licensing 
23 for that. 
24 MR. JENSEN: Mr. Jensen, to follow up on my questior, 
25 though. On that issue, if you focus only on the police --
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1 deterring illegal police conduct, one of the comments written 
2 on this recently is suggesting that what we are doing is 
3 saying to the police, "If you can demonstrate we are not 
4 deterring your conduct, we will repeal the exclusionary 
5 rule. So every time you make a search that exceeds the 
6 bounds of the constitution, you are demonstrating that 
7 the exclusionary rule doesn't work, and therefore encouraging 
8 its repeal." Does that persuade you at all? 
9 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I can't really accept that 
10 reasoning, if I understand it. I'm not sure I have got 
11 it all fixed in my mind. But I don't think that reasoning 
12 is such that it would be a valid argument to the notion 
13 we should abdicate the exclusionary rule. I just don't 
14 see it. 
15 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Michael? 
16 MR. ULLMAN: If you state the courts still say 
17 that the integrity of the court is still a reason for the 
18 exclusionary rule in California, why do you think if the 
19 Legislature amended 1538.5 to allow for a vicarious 
20 exclusionary rule, why do you think the courts would buy 
21 that? Isn't that still --
22 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I don't know. I don't knqw 
23 that they would. 1 ' 
24 MR. ULLMAN: A violation of the integrity of 
25 the courts? 
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1 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: That's up to them. 
2 MR. ULLMAN~ Do you have any prognosis? 
3 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I have no idea. It seems 
4 to me that at some point --
5 
6 
MR. ULLMAN: Educated guess? 
MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Well, I give you one. There 
7 was a case, there was a kind of a furor about the mock 
8 notice of the burglar having the rights of the policeman 
9 on the mock notice, and that came through the court of 
10 appeal, and when it came to the supreme court, it was thrown 
11 out. 
12 I don't see an awful lot of difference between 
13 that kind of concept, and the victim being able to have 
14 the rights -- or the pimp being able to use the rights 
15 of the girl who was his victim. I don't really think that 
16 that's a lot different. 
n MR. ULLMAN: Isn't the integrity of the court 
18 process that we are not going to be a party to the introducinc 
19 of unlawful evidence? And the case Mr. Knox cited, his 
10 hypothetical, isn't that a clear violation --
11 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: It may be. But I think to 
12 me, in a way, it's baiting your question, because the decisio 
13 that is it legal comes afterwards. There are situations 
14 where it doesn't make sense to retroactively make up a 
15 rule and then be worried about the integrity of the court 
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1 where there is no unlawful conduct at all. I don't see 
2 h ow the integrity of the court is offended by that. 
3 If you want to make up a rule that you feel is 
4 a rise now for the police to follow, that's fine. But 
5 it doesn ' t mean you have to 
6 MR. ULLMAN: What about Mr. Knox's example where 
7 the police break down a friend's house and discovery 
8 Mr. Knox's contraband? Do you think there is any problem 
9 as far as the integrity of the court, or the unlawfulness 
10 of the police conduct in that example? 
11 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: I think there could be, I 
12 think there could be. But that gets into the notion about 
13 the sweep of all these. It may very well be, but what 
14 we are really talking about is getting back to good faith 
15 and reasonable kind of approaches to this. I think if 
16 you were to pose a good faith and reasonable conduct 
17 kind of implementation, that you are going to take care 
18 of the judicial integrity problem. 
19 Let me just pick up on one thing I think is impor-
20 tant. Your question about search warrants, I think, is 
2 1 an important one. There are increasingly search warrants 
22 in use. And this is because the rules that are being posed 
23 are becoming more clear that the courts expect the police 
24 to get search warrants. Police will do that if they feel 
25 that is what is necessary. If they feel they are required 
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1 to do so. What's really gone on in the past, that they 
2 really didn't know they were expected to get search warrants. 
3 There were situations where it was somewhat vague and ambigu-
4 ous as to whether you were, and those you might say they 
5 were lazy. There were other situations where they had 
6 no idea they were supposed to get a search warrant. We 
7 had one case where it's in violation because the police 
8 held some evidence in a police locker after an arrest. 
9 And they looked in the police locker, and then the courts 
10 afterwards said you're supposed to get a search warrant 
11 for that. The police had no idea they were supposed to 
12 do that. Now if you put out a rule that said you got to 
13 have a search warrant for that, they will go get a search 
14 warrant. But let me say this: There is an easy kind of 
15 assumption that getting search warrants is relatively 
16 simple. That the courts are in session quote unquote. 
17 The search warrant is a relatively complicated process. 
18 It takes a little while. And the courts are in session 
19 doing a lot of other things in addition to issuing search 
10 warrants. There is court time involved, there is police 
21 time involved. We are talking about a good deal of an 
22 investment of time and resources against that. I am not 
23 arguing against it, but you have to be rational, and you 
24 have to be realistic when you say we need a search warrant 
25 every time we have either booked in or we have done something 
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1 else. You are imposing a real burden on the system. And 
2 if you want to do that, fine. But you do it with your 
3 eyes open. 
4 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well, review for me what you 
5 need. Say you're looking through a telescope and you see 
6 what you think are marijuana plants in somebody's house. 
7 Do you have to get a search warrant? You have seen the 
8 contraband, right? 
9 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: If you want to, you have 
10 to get a search warrant, I will go get a search warrant. 
11 The issue is --
12 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: No. The issue is under the 
13 present law, in your opinion. 
14 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Well, I think you'd get a 
15 search warrant. You'd definitely get a search warrant. 
16 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Why? 
17 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Because you're supposed to 
18 get a search warrant. And the rules that have been put 
19 down, if you don't get a search warrant, you are not going 
20 to be effective in prosecuting. It won't be used. 
21 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: But you've seen them. 
MR. LOWELL JENSEN: But that's-- if you want 
23 to go back --
24 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Let's say you're looking through 
25 a window and you see somebody shoot somebody. Do you have 
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1 to get a search warrant to break in there? 
2 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Not under present law. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Well then, why do you need 
4 a search warrant if you see marijuana plants through a 
5 telescope? 
MR. LOWELL JENSEN: The courts have said so. 
7 And what I am saying 
8 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: On what grounds do the courts 
9 insist on that? 
10 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: They feel it's an appropriate 
11 kind of use of the warrant process. And going through 
12 the initial and detached judicial magistrate to find out 
13 whether or not you should intrude upon that particular 
14 household is something that ought to be done by the search 
15 warrant process. That's all right with me. 
16 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What court holds that? What 
17 case holds that? 
18 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: There's a case -- I can't 
19 really give you the case numbers. 
20 MR. ULLMAN: Just one on trial in Alameda County? 
21 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: We got a search warrant. 
22 Well, what I'm saying is there are four areas 
23 I would like you to consider under AB 3399. One was to 
24 amend 1538.5 to take out the notion of the retroactivity 
25 as far as the imposition of rules is concerned, the other 
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1 is good faith searches, the other is vicarious exclusions, 
2 and the fourth is that a search warrant that is to be obtaine 
3 by an officer by making a complete disclosure of the informa-
4 tion he has, and no misrepresentation, once a judge issues 
5 that, that should be a good search warrant. And if there 
6 is to be some kind of sanction on a judge, if he's willing 
7 to do it, it should not be exclusion to in fact come up 
8 with something else. That you are going to encourage search 
9 warrants, we also ought to encourage their utility by saying 
10 that a police officer goes in and gives the information 
11 to the judge, ought to be protected. And that's a good 
12 search warrant. 
13 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: One question so the public 
14 is not misled. Assuming the Legislature amended Section 
15 1538.5 along the lines you suggest. Then wouldn't you 
16 agree that it's quite questionable as to whether the present 
17 California Supreme Court would uphold that statute? 
18 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Perhaps so. 
19 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: That's the point I want to 
20 make. 
21 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: But I think it's a matter 
22 of legislative wisdom. And I think that you can change 
23 the total percentage when the court is ruling on ·something 
24 specific. 
25 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Without arguing, you say 
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1 legislative wisdom. You know, it's really popular to put 
2 these bills in, because the society today is very conserva-
3 tive. But I think it's unfair sometimes to mislead 
4 the p u b 1 i c to think the Legislature can change 
5 things. 
6 In terms of our division of power, the supreme 
7 court has taken upon itself, and I suppose rightfully so, 
8 the ability to construe the constitution, the California 
9 Constitution. And they are bound by the federal rules 
10 as well. And it's very questionable, based on current 
11 law, as to whether they are going to uphold a statute adopted 
12 by the Legislature which flys in the face of the prior 
13 rulings interpreting the constitution. 
14 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Perhaps I was a little hasty. 
15 I don't think it really is that questionable. I think 
16 if it were narrowly drawn and specifically directed to 
17 the issues I spoke to, there is a very good chance the 
18 supreme court would say that's a valid and kind of expression 
19 of the exclusionary rule in California. 
20 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: I appreciate that. 
21 Peter? 
22 MR. JENSEN: Mr. Chairman, my question -- Mr. Jenser, 
23 relating to the vicarious standing rule, is it your position 
24 that no matter how outrageous the search, no matter how 
25 gross the violation of the constitutional rights, if it 
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1 wasn't your rights that were violated, you should not be 
2 able to raise the issue? I mean, if you follow the line 
3 of reasoning in the courts, and I'm not saying you do or 
4 you don't , but it's inconsistent to say it matters whose 
5 rights were violated. If they kicked in the door and grabbed 
6 the material without a warrant, because it wasn't your 
7 right, you can't raise that issue. 
8 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: As I said, I am perfectly 
9 willing to have a good faith law on that. I see no reason 
10 why you can't use that as a modification of the notion 
11 of what's standing, ought to be provided. 
12 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Jensen 
13 MR. ULLMAN: Can I ask one question? 
14 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Yes, Mr. Ullman. 
15 MR. ULLMAN: You alluded to the last part of 
16 the bill which was if the magistrate signs the warrant, 
17 it's good for all purposes. Would you have any thoughts 
18 if 11 magistrates turned it down, saying obviously that's 
19 against the law, and the 12th magistrate signed it, should 
20 that also not be reversible on appeal? 
21 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Well, perhaps the judicial 
22 counsel could have training sessions for them. 
23 MR. ULLMAN: What about some large jurisdictions 
24 where the magistrates just sign these warrants? You do 
25 agree that when a warrant is taken to a magistrate, it 
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1 is not an adversary process. He is basically told --
2 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: By definition, I agree. 
3 MR. ULLMAN: and there be some sort of provision 
4 at least, where the other side could present cases as to 
5 why the warrant isn't justified. 
6 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Without being too facetious, 
7 you could do that by way of a response mechanism that isn't 
8 the exclusionary rule. You could address that kind of 
9 problem 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What's the penalty if an officer 
II makes a false affidavit to get a search warrant under the 
12 present law? 
MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Well now it -- well, it could 
14 be criminal. And it is not a good search warrant. 
15 
16 
MR. ULLMAN: In California it is not a good 
ASSEMBLYMAN ·KNOX: I was going to suggest there 
17 might be a tradeoff, here, for some of these things where 
18 the officer serves the term instead of the alleged burglar 
19 or something. 
20 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: The CPOA may be opposed to 
21 that. 
22 MR. ULLMAN: Mr. Van De Kamp and Justice Jensen 
23 have advocated going to the federal process. And do you 
24 agree in the federal if the officer makes a false statement 
25 in the warrant, the federal process would just exorcise 
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1 that statement, and the warrant would still be good? But 
2 under the California rules, the whole warrant could go? 
3 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: That's right. 
4 MR. ULLMAN: And you would advocate that the 
5 warrant should still be valid if all the other statements 
6 in the warrant are valid? 
7 MR. LOWELL JENSEN: Well, I don't know that I --
8 we didn't put that in the bill against it. The bill that 
9 we suggested is if there's a misrepresentation, it's not 
10 a good warrant. 
11 MR. ULLMAN: As I understand Mr. Van De Kamp, 
12 he wants to go to the federal rules. Whatever the federal 




MR. LOWELL JENSEN: That may be. I'm not sure. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: You're welcome. 
17 Next we have Mr. John Cleary, who is with the 
18 California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. 
19 MR. CLEARY: I would ask permission, if I could 
20 of the committee, a written statement will be filed later. 
21 I realize the time is getting short, and you have heard 
22 quite a bit, and I am hoping that somewhat with equal oppor-
23 tunity to respond to the rather lengthy and informative 
24 remaks of the two district attorneys that preceded me. 
25 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Surely. When we receive 
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1 receive your remarks, they will also be made a part of 
2 the record, as have the remarks of the previous district 
3 attorneys. 
4 MR. CLEARY: Thank you very much. 
5 I would indicate I am representing not only the 
6 California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, but the California 
7 Public Defender's Association, and to show you some types 
a of confusion that can exist not only among the poor police 
9 officer, but sometimes among legislatures as to the exclusion ry 
10 rule. 
11 The case you mention in California about going 
12 into the trunk and into the box that the woman permitted 
13 was not dictated by California law, but rather dictated 
14 by federal law. The Chadwick Saunders case. And so hence, 
15 that was the situation that wouldn't change, no matter 
16 what you would do, and your unhappiness, perhaps, with 
17 Justice Burger who wrote Saunders. So I can't say that 
18 we know what they are. 
19 Basically, search and seizure questions are factual 
20 And I am here to kind of expouse the echo of Mr. Van De Kamp' 
21 "There is nothing practical as good theory." And if you 
22 go back to where we are as persons, and think about why 
23 we have the Fourth Amendment, it's turned out the police 
24 in their unabated desire to seize contraband that had not 
25 been taxed, wanted the open-ended writ: "trust us," you 
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1 know? Give us this open-ended writ. And the English system, 
2 provided with the English judgment in this country, granted 
3 it. 
4 Famous stakes from James Otis came before the 
5 English judges and he said, "Can't fly. It's against funda-
6 mental fairness. Invade the man's cast. These things 
7 don't work." What do you think the English judges said? 
8 "Right on, brother." What the crown needs, the crown gets. 
9 And so away they went and had to live. But if you study 
10 the history of this country, that was one of the basic 
11 seed bed concerns in the revolt against the English constabu-
12 lary and the English Crown. And if you think this is clear 
13 unhistorical reference, I only direct your attention to 
14 the words of Justice Bradley and the great opinion of 
15 Boyd vs. United States. And the point he makes here is 
16 advice not only projected for the Legislature. He says: 
17 Obsta Principiis, "Adhere to principle." Because what 
18 has happened is we see an erosion of principle, and instead 
19 of a fundamental principle, we hear the pious platitudes 
20 of unprincipled pragmaticism. "What the cops need, the 
21 cops should get." This is not what you take an oath to 
12 uphold, because you, too, take an oath to uphold the constitu 
23 tion. 
24 In 1914 we had Weeks. What were the .two basic 
25 grounds? Was police deterrence in Weeks? Was it to deter 
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1 the constable who's blundered? No. Who wrote that? How 
2 many Bolsheviki pinkos were on the Supreme Court in 1914? 
3 The point was the two basic arguments: one, if you don't 
4 have the exclusionary rule, you might as well strike the 
5 Fourth Amendment from the Constitution. The second is 
6 kind of a morality, and maybe morality has gone out of 
7 fashion these days. And that is, "The end does not justify 
8 the means." That if we allow police officers to use illegall 
9 seized evidence, we have a judicial proceeding, a concept 
10 that infects the whole process. And that we are ratifying 
11 after the fact. 
12 Now I heard Chief Justice Burger quoted here, 
13 and I think he's a distinguished judicial authority. And 
14 if you notice in Bivens, the thing you forget about it 
15 was when he wanted to provide an alternative such as fining 
16 officers, or having pecuniary damages, he dissented on 
17 that issue. And they provided in that opinion an alternative 
18 So I think the Chief Justice spoke out of both sides of 
19 his mouth. 
20 But there is another jurist in American history 
2 1 that some of us respect and admire, one who adheres to 
22 judicial integrity opinions in a case not often cited. 
23 Silverthorne vs. United States. The justice was Oliver 
24 Wendell Holmes, and Holmes said, "You can't use this evidence 
25 at all. It corrupts the whole system." So you have proponen s 
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1 on either side. Nevertheless to say, the California Supreme 
2 Court has adopted the Bradley baked Holmes Brandeis view 
3 vis a vis the burglar or Powell, more recent interpretation 
4 views. And so that seems to be the philosophy. But I 
5 would dare to say like, you know, the old quote about there's 
6 more in reality than in philosophies, that there are at 
7 least three other grounds for the exclusionary rule. One, 
s protection of the fundamental right of privacy; another 
9 very important ground that's often neglected is the concept 
10 that government is subject to the rule of law. Don't you 
11 have its minions? The front line officer is subject to 
12 the law. Or do you want an unlimited police force? When 
13 you start raising some of these questions, say to yourself 
14 if you had to compare the American police in their nice 
15 spiffy uniforms against a kind of rough hewn Soviet minitzia ph) 
16 or their KGB, how would you define the techniques of the 
17 indifferent? Well you say, "Under ours, they are under 
. 18 the rule of law. There's restraint." And people come 
19 in and say we want to take away those restraints. Aren't 
20 they really getting at the bedrock of democracy? Isn't 
21 our principle of government the fact that you're here listeni g 
22 to this as a diffusion of power? The supremes are not 
23 supreme in California, they have got to deal with the Governo 
24 and the Attorney General, the executive, and they have 
25 got to deal with you, the Legislature. Because we don't 
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1 trust anybody. And when a police officer says, "Trust 
2 me", we say, "It's nothing personal." But it's our way 
3 of government that we don't trust any executive. We don't 
4 trust anyone anywhere along the line. 
5 You are right now in a posture of asking what 
6 can we do to take the handcuffs off the police? Dribble, 
7 I say. The thing should be turned around the other way. 
8 What are we doing to protect the Constitution? When I 
9 say constitution, I say the Federal Constitution, because 
10 that's part of your oath. And that, of course, is the 
11 Fourteenth Amendment, incorporating the Fourth Amendment 
due process clause. And we get the search and seizure 12 
13 requirements under that. But what about Article I, Section 
14 1, fundamental right of privacy, Justice Jefferson? Article 
15 I, Section 13, the California equivalent of the Fourteenth 
16 Amendment; Article I, Section 24, "all rights not previously 
17 ennumerated are in the people." So what are their representa 
18 tives to protect those collective rights? I say to you 
19 that we don't see it. 
20 Now I would commend to your attention, and I 
21 hate to say it, since I know that both of you are wishing 
12 farewell to the Legislature, for the record anyway, who 
23 is now permitting that, Judge Oaks, not the professor, 
24 wrote an excellent work called, "Constitutional Government 
25 in America." It came out of the Carolina Press this year, 
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1 1980, and he covers a lot of these things in a much more 
2 elaborate facing than I can do here. Let me just quickly 
3 describe the alternative. My father was a Chicago police 
4 officer for 27 years, and I have a kind of vicarious under-
5 standing of the police system. Some might say not the 
6 best, but it has given me some insight in my 20 years of 
7 criminal law practice, and how the system really functions. 
8 And this is where the con job comes down. Meaning that 
9 you're lawyers, I'm a lawyer, we're practicing in the crimina 
10 justice system. What the people know, and what we know 
11 is two different things. I would like to see the people 
12 know as much about the system, and I think they would be 
13 champions for the exclusionary rule. But they're given 
14 only little glimpses of what occurs. First, criminal actions 
15 which we have touched on already. What about criminal 
16 actions? You've got a one, 146 of the California Penal 
17 Code, misdemeanor offense. But if the officer wanted to, 
18 you could have some strong, courageous US attorney charge 
19 them under 18 USC 241 and 242, violation of constitutional 
20 rights. Can you tell me how many cases you have that have 
21 been brought, how many have been successful? We hear another 
2.2 one, contempt. Dean Nigmore said, the great leader, not 
23 a fan of the exclusionary rule by any means, but he didn't 
24 want hearsay, either. And he said with a truth seeking 
25 system, maybe hearsay gets in the way. Why not add just 
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1 quadruple hearsay? It's truth. Everything for the truth. 
2 Who's truth? Well, he said what you should have is this 
3 type of situation, the man comes in, a burglary, and the 
4 officers busted into his house and found the stolen TV 
5 set and dragged the culprit into the court. And the judge 
6 says very simply, "Okay, 16 months. Send him away to the 
7 joint. You officer Jones, for your disobedience of the 
8 Constitution of the Federal Government and the California, 
9 30 days. Take him away." 
10 Now, for those who live in the real world, that's 
11 ridiculous. It doesn't work. And to say that such a remedy, 
12 which is now in the books, and the judges have that power, 
13 it's facetious. We heard about the internal police disciplin . 
14 I won't bother you with the fact that the police have a 
15 big image media concern these days, and their battle with · 
16 civilian review boards and many others, I am not troubled. 
17 And one jurisdiction I know they allowed officers to take 
18 away breaks if they took a bribe and give them a character 
19 reference. So it's not the image -- injury -- the image 
20 of the police department. 
21 But take the other situation about you have this 
22 conduct of going out and getting things, putting those 
23 crooks away. Don't worry about the means, just get them, 
24 put them away. You have this large scale activity. Even 
25 when it's reviewed inhouse, don't you have -- Saint Paul's 
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1 adage, "There but for the grace of God go I"? 
2 Jack Muller, a Chicago police detective said, 
3 when he asked about internal investigation division, how 
4 effective and thorough they were, he said, "They are like 
5 a great big washing machine. Everything you put in them 
6 comes out clean." He was disciplined for that, and got 
7 his letter of reprimand removed after a court action on 
8 the Seventh Circuit. Civil action. 
9 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: There are other problems 
10 with it, too. His conduct was sometimes outrageous in 
11 terms of traffic tickets, and all. 
12 MR. CLEARY: He had outrageous traffic tickets. 
13 He was a little bit ink hungry, I think is the term, and 
14 I think that 1 s a very fair assessment. 
15 In civil action, this is where the action is 
16 right now. And it 1 s ironic that the officers are now protect d 
17 in civil actions by good faith, and they are asking this 
18 Legislature to do something which I don 1 t think it can, 
19 is to give good faith insulation on criminal actions. But 
ZO take a look at what is good faith, or where it came about. 
2 1 I happen to come from a county where we have 
22 a nominee for Congress from the Klu Klux Klan 1 and the 
23 ironic statute that preserves the citizens rights these 
24 days, is the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871, which we now know 
ZS as 42 USC 1983. The Civil Rights statute. And under 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE, SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 
TELEPHONE (916) 383-3601 
0 
73 
1 Monroe vs. Pace, as you remember where the Chicago police 
2 lieutenant, rather enthusiastic, had a unique way of inter-
3 rogating when he'd break into a house, stand everybody 
4 up against the wall, whole family naked, and when the person 
5 didn't talk, grabbed the suspect, hauled him down to the 
6 police station, interrogated him for two more days and 
7 let him go. He was the wrong guy. And then when he filed 
a a suit, what suit did this individual, this obstreperous 
9 citizen file against this officer? He filed the Civil 
10 Rights Act, the Klu Klux Act of 1871. And when the --
11 what did the officer say? Boy, they're quick. "Hey, if 
12 this was so outrageous, I couldn't be under color of law. 
u I was ultra vires." And the local judge said, "Right on, 
14 brother. I'm not going to hit any police officer with 
15 any suit up to the supremes." Justice Douglas said, "Hey, 
16 that can't fly. Your apparent authority is therefore under 
17 color of law, and you can get money damages." 
18 Now interestingly enou.gh we have seen a tremendous 
19 expansion, two years ago when Monell vs. The Department 
20 of Social Services, this is something the Legislature had 
21 to respond to the public. Money damages can now be laid 
22 at the doors of the Legislature. In Monroe vs. Pate, you 
2J can sue the officer, but not the government instrumentality. 
24 Now under Monell, you can sue the government instrumentality. 
25 So you can get these damages against the unit of government. 
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1 Then take it one step further. We had two more 
2 cases came down this year that's just going light years 
3 expansion. Owen vs. The City of Independence. What did 
4 they say there? The good faith defense of the officer, 
5 which he still preserves in the civil suit, is not available 
6 to the instrumentality. And then we had C-onzales vs. 'lbledo wffire . , 
7 the court held that the burden of pleading is upon the 
8 officer to show good faith, not the plaintiff to show the 
9 absence of good faith. 
10 I don't want to bore you with all of this, but 
11 under California law you have government code 995. If 
12 I'm a police officer and I kick the daylights out of somebody 
1J I can go down and county counsel could represent me. And 
14 you can get a judgment, and they will be secured. I am 
15 suggesting a legislative alternative, and that is my specific 
16 proposition. That in the case where motion to suppress 
17 is granted in whole or in part, a judge has or should have 
18 discretion to appoint counsel much in the same way as you 
19 would under the criminal proceeding to pursue civil adminis-
10 trative remedies. You are no longer making illusory, but 
11 we don't have that now on the books. 
12 I think another problem we don't understand is 
13 the real world of how the system functions. There is a 
14 symbiotic relationship between the police, the prosecutors, 
15 and the courts. And it's unhealthy. I think if I stood 
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1 on the bench someplace I'd be proprosecution and not think 
2 of my orientation, possibly, but systematically would be 
3 forced to go. Cops make the cases, prosecutors have unfetter d 
4 discretion to bring about and file charges in any cases 
5 they determine to be appropriate. And the third, the judges, 
6 is have to move those cases up and out. What is the most 
7 agreegeous sin of a judge? Having a backlog. So there 
a you have an interrelationship. It is not there deliberately, 
9 but there is this hint of a relationship that means more 
10 than the theoretical announcement that this is the independen e 
11 of the judiciary. 
12 I'd like to also speak about the practical concerns 
13 when we deal in good faith. I've heard good faith here 
14 until I'm sick of it. What is good faith? Well, first 
15 of all the Williams case has been brought up and has been 
16 criticized, and I won't bore you with the details here. 
17 But I'll start off first with is good faith is no more 
18 than the subjective belief of the officer. And there you're 
19 going to be in a courtroom examining whether the officer 
20 knew -- deliberately busted into the house, or gee whiz, 
21 he just walked by and fell into the door and here he was. 
22 What you're going to do to explain that conduct where the 
23 physical conduct will remain the same is allow the suppressio 
24 issue to be determined on the mental state of the officer. 
25 So that you are going right back to where the Fourth Amendmen 
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1 was not, the writ of assistance, and the good faith you 
2 are now putting back, you find a conjunction for the two. 
3 Second is when will you be able to detect a lack of good 
4 faith? I commend to your attention a reading of a case 
5 written by the former US Attorney of Chicago, now a circuit 
6 judge, in US vs. Cortina. There an agent lied in the prepara 
7 tion of a search warrant. The only reason it ever came 
8 up was that the FBI, which has these tremendous 302 Statement 
9 in the file, he had recorded all of his source information. 
10 And what happened was the prosecutors came to the court 
11 and said, "Well, Your Honor, we feel that maybe defense 
12 counsel would want to review their motion to suppress in 
13 light of this additional evidence that we have." In essence, 
14 the prosecutor voluntarily gave over evidence for which 
15 the judge said this officer, when you compare his statements 
16 and compare what the informant said under oath, and what 
17 the other parties testified as to what occurred, was a 
18 liar, and such a liar that J. Edgar Hoover would be rolling 
19 over in his mausoleum if he had understood the nature. 
20 And they quote both the district court and the appellate 
21 court in describing the conduct. US vs. Cortina indicates 
22 how difficult it was to surface -- this was unique, this 
23 case in which it surfaced. 
24 Another factor that you have to deal with when 
25 a factual dispute occurs, and again I am dealing with experts 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE, SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95826 



























in this issue, what do you tell my client? You're my client, 
and you say the officers kicked in your door. And Officer 
Googenheim is going to say, "No way. He knocked 12 minutes 
before he entered. Notice police, please open up, the 
house is surrounded." And then after waiting, you know, 
50 seconds, he kicks in the door and there you are. And 
you are charging that he just said, "Cops," and the door 
came off the hinges. Well who -- what I mean, as a lawyer, 
what would you say? Ironically I had a case exactly like 
this. And when the agent came back in and he asked after 
there was a quick witness put on the stand, he thought 
it was the defendant, because no one entered the courtroom. 
"Now officer, you have testified it was 40 seconds 
before you make the announcement. What if a person testified 
that your knocking off the door was contemporaneous with 
your hollering out 'cops,' or not more than two seconds 
thereafter?" 
"That person would be a liar." 
It turned out to be one of the senior assistants 
of the US Attorney who happened to be jogging by at the 
time. The judge said, "Well, maybe you want to reconsider 
this case." And it was, you know, dismissed out. But 
these are, you know, where it is ever detected, because 
when it comes down to the courtroom, I think any judge 
would be sitting there would have to follow the officer. 
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1 I think that also the other one you are dealing 
2 with is putting a premium on ignorance. You are saying 
3 now -- and one of the things about the officers, and the 
4 difficulty is this: If you operate with common sense, 
5 and the common sense is I don't get into areas unless I 
6 think that there is some basis, if I am invading someone's 
7 privacy, I want some overview, et cetera. And I think 
8 as we take that approach, the need for warrants and examina-
9 tion of exigencies will work out. The search warrant process 
10 itself, if you try to rely on good faith, you are going 
II to run right into the second clause of the Fourth Amendment, 
12 and my second one is that first of all, look at the real 
13 world of issuance of search warrants. I was at a program 
14 where a judge in LA, a senior criminal judge, indicated 
15 that it even helps police officers properly phrase the 
I' warrants for their issuance. This is a neutral detached 
17 magistrate . I am suggesting that the Legislature should 
18 create a public privacy ombudsman, not someone connected 
19 with the defense, because people are being searched. They 
20 are not yet defendants or suspects. T~ey might have probable 
2 1 cause to believe that there's something out there. So 
22 that you can have this third party examined. You have 
2J telephonic warrants in California. So all you got to do 
24 is just hook them onto the telephone and have some comments, 
25 and then you can start to implement the spirit of what 
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1 all of our legislation is, rather than giving them open 
2 tickets. 
3 The last two things I'd like to touch on very 
4 briefly, and I know you're very busy and you have to hear 
5 from others, and that is this need for empirical data. 
6 And I can only echo Mr. Van De Kamp's concern, you would 
7 ask about the survey. That survey came out, there was 
8 only 2800 federal cases. Now I do have to admit with 
9 Mr. Van De Kamp, the sensitivity of the federal courts 
10 is admittedly much lower than that of the California courts. 
11 In fact, ironically when you get one of our attorneys, 
12 a federal defender goes into state court, even the worst 
13 over there is considerably better than our best by comparison 
14 So I have to admit that that's something you don't want 
15 to really cut down on. You really want to give accolade 
16 that California has come so far forward. In that survey 
17 of 2800 cases, the motions suppressed that were granted 
18 were in 1.3 percent of the cases. In the 1.3 percent of 
19 the cases in which it was granted, 50 percent were still 
20 convicted. And how often do we see a judge who, when a 
21 defense lawyer says, you know, last time you granted a 
22 motion to suppress was 10 years ago, he quickly says, "~vhat 
23 do you mean? I gave it in that case II Yeah, he kicked 
24 out the two bags of marijuana, but the one kilo of cocaine 
25 comes in. Whomp, your client goes off for 15 years. He 
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1 granted a motion to suppress. Well, this is the real world, 
2 and I find it very difficult. So what I would suggest 
3 is that you commission that survey, in fact, I thought 
4 some of your questions were very excellent, Mr. Van De Kamp 
5 was very honest about the lack of data, and I think we 
6 should have an objective, if you will, not just solely 
7 your prosecutors determining what the nature of evidence 
8 might be. I'd like the comptroller general, I don't know 
9 the equivalent in California, but whatever the body might 
10 be to conduct that. 
11 The last thing that I'd like to do is I'd like 
12 to see us avoid demagogy, and you know someone said here, 
13 throw strikes at one another. I think that law enforcement 
14 officers are doing a very fine job in the state. I don't 
15 think they are as dumb as a lot of people would attribute 
16 them. In fact, my experience is that an attorney of a 
17 few years' experience can't even come equal to an officer 
18 with 10 years' experience, especially if that officer has 
19 worked in narcotics or some specialized division. They 
20 are cagey, smart, they know the groundrules, they know 
21 the judges, they know the players, they do a superb job. 
22 And I don't discount it. I think that encouragement to 
23 follow the constitutional mandates upgrades the profession, 
24 instead of bringing on criticism of law enforcement apparatus 
25 that we saw in another state, Florida, have really dire 
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1 consequences where they felt their officers could, with 
2 impunity, beat a man to death. And ironically the jury 
3 in that case, which I don't find any fault with their verdict 
4 turned on the fact that they gave too much immunity to 
5 the wrong people. And so the people didn't understand 
6 when they were rioting in l-1iami what the problems of the 
7 case. Well, we in the system have a duty to educate the 
8 public, and if we run around with this political rhetoric, 
9 to slam bang one another, we not only undermine the very 
10 basis of our society, but we antagonize one another until 
11 we can no longer deal with one another in an intelligent 
12 fashion. 
13 The only thing I would end on is Justice Bradley's 
14 comments, Obsta Principiis, Adhere to principle and follow 
15 your oath. 
16 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Cleary 
17 Next we have Mr. Michael McClure of the California 
18 Trial Lawyers Association. 
19 I am going to ask Mr. McClure and the other speaker 
20 to submit the written statements later on, and they will 
21 be incorporated as part of the recorm. And I'd like them 
22 to try and summarize their testimony as best they can so 
23 we can finish at a relatively early hour this evening. 
24 We have got five more witnesses, Mr. McClure. 
25 MR. McCLURE: Thank you. I'll try to timit 
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1 it, Mr. Chairman, and perhaps respond to some of the things 
2 that have been said previously, as well as cover the question~ 
3 that were raised. 
4 Let me start where in a sense Mr. Cleary stopped, 
5 and that was with the idea that the good faith reliance 
6 in connection with search warrants that was recommended, 
7 and also the situation change 1538.5 that perhaps Mr. Jensen 
8 and Mr. Van De Kamp suggested, and take your chances. You 
9 are already taking your chances, because each decision 
10 decides itself on the factual basis presented on the particul r 
11 search that takes place in a particular case. 
12 I think that one of the things that, you know, 
13 are asked to make a change in 1538.5 and see what the results 
14 are, I think you should stay consistent with the situation 
15 that we have now, and consider the fact that although probabl 
1& every police officer in the State of California carries 
17 a little reminder in his pocket when he stops you and pulls 
18 out a card that has the Miranda decision very well typed 
19 on it, the same response is not true in the connection 
20 with the search and seizure situations where he doesn't 
2 1 have the latest decision of the California Supreme Court 
22 or the appellate district in which he is working to respond 
23 to, Perhaps a little additional information in that area 
24 to police officers might be of assistance, although it's 
25 not been mentioned here today. 
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1 It is quite consistent that the statistical informa 
2 tion that you should have which is not before you, and 
3 was the last thing Mr. Cleary suggested, is probably true. 
4 You should know how many cases are really thrown out as 
5 a result of an unlawful search and seizure. I agree with 
6 Mr. Cleary there are a number of officers who have had 
7 vast experience, and who are probably entirely more experienc~d 
8 than two-year lawyers out of law school. But the vast 
9 majority of search and seizures result in an officer who 
10 may be simply, as Assemblyman Knox mentioned earlier, making 
11 a routine stop and a public situation, and conducting a 
12 search based upon initial information. But if you have 
13 the statistics in California, not only the federal phases 
14 as to how many cases are really excluded, or how many cases 
15 result as Mr. Jensen indicated, in being completly thrown 
16 out as a result of the search and seizure. That statistics 
17 are very limited, and I speak only from experience, not 
18 from what occurs in Alameda or Los Angeles County, but 
19 I know in my own trial practice experience, that the amount 
20 of time that you have a search warrant sustained, or a 
21 search sustained as a result of it being unlawful, it•s 
22 very limited. Very few times do you ever have a judge 
23 acknowledge that there is an unlawful search and seizure 
24 based upon case law. A~d I think that the important thing 
25 is that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. 
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1 You must maintain it. And modification of 1538.5, 
2 I don't think will assist at all in this area. I think 
3 it will start a new plethora of cases which will come down 
4 to determine what that modification of 1538.5 means. 
5 And just to step over for the moment in the search 
6 warrant area, an officer comes in and says, "Mr. Magistrate, 
7 trust me." We've seen probably the most recent results 
8 of that is where the judge testified that actually some 
9 of the police report that in the most recent case --
10 some of the police report he read was completely -- he 
11 was unable to read it because the Xeroxing copy attached 
12 to the search warrant, he couldn't read. But instead, 
13 he relied upon the good faith affidavit of the police officer 
14 and said, "Fine, I will issue the search warrant." That 
15 was suppressed, of course. I think the important part 
16 is not that you can follow the federal situation and say 
17 we have some bad language contained in the affidavit, there-
18 fore we just excise the bad language or excise the cancer, 
19 and we maintain the search warrant. You have to, as we 
20 do, reverse the search warrant and see whether or not the 
21 officer has stated in this affidavit as truly correct, 
22 or whether what he has stated is maybe based upon some 
23 very laudatory language, but a lot of which is untrue, 
24 or may have come from sources which are not totally true. 
25 If you change 1538.5, then you are left with a situation 
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of not being able to go in and totally traverse that warrant 
and find out what in fact did this officer rely on when 
he made the statement, so I don't think you can totally 
get good faith. 
Mr. Van De Kamp said something in the early part 
of his testimony that I think is essential in the idea 
of statistics, and I think really what happens in the search 
warrant case, and that is he stated a phrase, "It depends 
on the situation of each particular case." And I think 
that's what you see on a constant basis. Trial lawyers 
in this state in any event are constantly reading the Advance 
Sheets. That's the Bible. When it comes in on Monday 
morning, you read through it, and you find out what is 
my situation, what now, if I receive a call this afternoon, 
what does my client have to establish, or not have to establi h 
in connection with having his house searched. As Assemblyman 
Knox said, whether it's a vicarious situation or something 
else, you go to the book to find out what is the latest 
situation. I think we find too often than not that perhaps 
the officer, whether it be a street officer, does not really 
know what that situation is. So it's left for the lawyers, 
the judges, and all of us at the time of hearing on a 1538.5 
motion to make that decision at that time. Perhaps a little 
additional information to officers would assist in avoiding 
that particular situation. We have to face it constantly, 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE. SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 
TELEPHONE (916) 383- 3601 
86 
1 the court has to face it constantly as to the changing 
2 situation with searchs and seizures in this state, as well 
3 as in the Federal Constitution. But we are obligated to 
4 stick up with it, and sometimes we get a feeling that the 
5 law enforcement people are not totally keeping up to date 
6 on what's happening yesterday, or the day before yesterday. 
7 I will be happy to supplement this with the written 
8 report, too, but I know you are pressed for time today. 
9 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you very much, 
10 Mr. McClure. 
11 Next we have Clifford Thompson from the Attorney 
11 General's Office. 
u MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, actually I didn't 
14 come today to present any pious unprincipled platitudes 
15 of pragmatism, or even an attempt to stampede the Legislature 
16 I regret that I feel a need to begin with that disclaimer, 
17 because I believe that however highly you prize the right 
18 to privacy, protecting that by expressing the truth, freeing 
19 the guilty, frustrating the victims, and punishing society 
20 ought wholly to be a legitimate, debated question. 
21 Twenty-five years ago in Cahan our court adopted 
l2 the exclusionary rule, deciding to pay that price, because 
23 they had in their view no alternative to try and -- law 
24 enforcement of the law. I would suggest to the committee 
15 that the rule becomes intolerable where today you pay the 
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1 price without getting the benefit of the deterrence. Since 
2 Cahan, our courts have forgotten the purpose of that decision 
3 which was to deter police misconduct, and broken its promise, 
4 which was to develop a workable rule as described by District 
5 Attorney Van De Kamp. 
6 Since Cahan, in fact our courts have transformed 
7 criminal courtrooms into police school~ooms. Schools in 
8 which the test comes first, and the lesson afterwards. 
9 Instead of the workable rules promised by Justice Cahan, 
10 we have gone to what Justice Gardner has so colorfully 
11 described as a: 
11 "kind of encrusted ritual of rigid, 
13 almost Byzantine in its frozen formality 
14 and labyrinthine protcol." 
15 Or a little more comprehensively, in the words 
16 of Justice Grodin in the People against Rodriguez: 
17 "For sure doctrinal obscurity, few 
18 areas of the law can compete with the 
19 quote rules governing the warrantless 
10 searches of automobiles." 
11 Now instead of workable rules, police have been 
12 required to anticipate the future course of search and 
23 seizure law; not what happened yesterday, but what's going 
24 to happen tomorrow. How can they do that? To understand 
25 the real extent of that difficulty, you have to have in 
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1 mind that one appellate California court has held that 
2 a nonlawyer magistrate cannot issue search warrants, because 
3 the law of search and seizure is beyond the comprehension 
4 of the layman. And another California appellate court 
5 has held that although the -police should have foreseen 
6 the situation in Dalton that an attorney need not -- a 
7 trained attorney practicing criminal law need not have 
8 foreseen that the supreme court would condemn the search 
9 of boxes found in a stolen automobile. 
10 Well, how did we come to this state of affairs? 
11 It's a result of two state judicial trends. One: is abandon 
12 ment of the concept of deterrence which prompted the adoption 
13 of the exclusionary rule in the first place; and the second: 
14 less important in this case, is the resort to the State 
15 Constitution to avoid Burger court limitations on Warren 
1' court decisions. And it's also true in Mapp vs. Ohio. 
17 Deterrence. What it means was the exclusion was a substitute 
18 for the punishment of the offending officer. Deterrence 
19 meant that the cop wouldn't have acted the way he did if 
20 he knew the court stood ready to exclude unlawfully obtained 
21 evidence. The critical element was his state of mind. 
22 He should have known better. Of course, as pointed out 
23 by a California appellate court in People against Moore, 
24 where the cop acts in good faith on the facts as they appear 
25 to him, no deterrent effect is involved. Why? Because 
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1 he's willing and presumably will act that way in the future. 
2 Now over the last six or seven years there has 
3 been one decision practically every term from the United 
4 States Supreme Court seeking to bring the aberration of 
5 the exclusionary rule into alignment with its deterrent 
6 purpose. Now it's clear that judicial integrity is going 
1 to abandon as a basis for the federal exclusionary rule, 
8 it's been done so explicitly in Michigan against Tucker, 
9 United States against ca.J,_apdra .. You can't fail to argue 
10 about that. The court has said the purpose of the rule 
11 is deterrence. And we are not going to -- all these cases 
12 are summed up, I think, in one. United States against calandra 
U which says: 
14 "We decline to extend the court-made 
15 exclusionary rule to cases in which its deter-
16 rent purpose would not be served." 
17 That's what's going on in the federal one, and 
18 I think probably next term, or possibly, very possibly 
19 next term, -..te are going to have the landmark decision. 
20 It's going to come in United States against Williams. Where 
21 the Fifth Circuit, sitting .en .bane, 24 federal judges in 
22 one of the most prestigious courts in America, a majority 
2J of them held good faith. Reasonable good faith, not a 
24 peer subjective test. We are not saying, and AB 3399 did 
25 not say that the police should be permitted to expand the 
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1 scope of searching by maintaining ignorance. Reasonable 
2 good faith. That's how it's-- stop and be reasonable. 
3 If 11 magistrates say the warrant's bad, and the 12th one 
4 says that it's good, that's not reasonable. I think they 
5 are going to decide that, that case, and that question 
6 of the Williams case. And any prediction about what the 
7 California Supreme Court would do to a statute that you 
8 might enact has to be understood, and has to be made in 
9 light of the Williams case. I mean, the premises are going 
10 to be changed fairly shortly. 
11 Now California, however, is headed in somewhat 
12 of a different direction. What has happened is deterrence 
13 has come to mean motivation of law enforcement as a whole, 
14 not the aberrant individual officer to formulate and pursue 
15 procedures which will avoid violation of privacy in the 
16 future. In short, the exclusionary rule is a technique 
17 whereby the court simultaneously gives new content to constit -
18 tional rights, and advises other branches of government 
19 of new limitations on their powers. And therefore, the 
20 rule -- the evidence is suppressed to teach them a lesson. 
21 It doesn't matter whether the cop acted in good faith, 
22 bad faith, he may have been in good faith, he may have 
23 acted reasonably. In fact, as in one case, the California 
24 Supreme Court, People against Scott, he may have acted 
25 in the court's v10rds with the quote discretion, even compassi n. 
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1 So individual sensitivity on the part of the police officer 
2 doesn't matter, because the idea we have got to teach every-
3 body a lesson. 
4 Now we have come so far from Cahan, we have just 
5 turned our back to Cahan, that excluded evidence in our 
6 courts not because the policeman has erred, or even the 
7 executive. But because there has been a judicial error, 
8 or a legislative error. The footwork of the Fourth Amendment 
9 is a warrant requirement, and the thrust of the exclusionary 
10 rule cases is to encourage resort to warrants. So what 
11 do you accomplish by suppressing evidence which the police 
12 find pursuant to a warrant? You discourage the police 
13 from going to the magistrate. Tremendous. Nevertheless, 
14 we apply the exclusionary rule in that context. Why? It's 
15 not the constable that's blundered, it's the magistrate 
16 who's miscalculated. No one has ever explained why. You 
17 can't find the decision that tells you the answer to that 
18 question. There can only be one reason in California, 
19 and that is that our magistrates who are lawyers by training, 
20 who are judges by profession, who are independent by consti-
21 tutional design, are either corrupt or incompetent. Now 
12 in either case, one would think the higher courts would 
23 have a moral obligation to tell the people that the magistrat s 
24 are untrustworthy guardians of their rights of privacy. 
25 But tha~'s not the case, and the Attorney General doesn't 
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1 think it is. They have an equal obligation to stop acting 
2 as if it were. 
3 It's quite well summed up, I think, in a case, 
4 California Intermediate Appellate case, People against Kirk. 
5 It says that the exclusionary rule: 
6 "has no rational application where 
7 the police officers in good faith submit 
8 the question of whether they have probable 
9 cause to a judicial officer." 
10 But we keep doing it. And that's a rule which 
11 I don't want to digress in detail now but that began 
12 life as an accident, and matured into an unexplained assurnp-
13 tion, and it now survives as an obstacle to the essential 
14 purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is to encourage 
15 the use of warrants, and to the central purpose of criminal 
16 trials, which is to determine the truth. Now if any rule 
17 could be more self defeating than that, it would have to 
18 be the one adopted by the majority of the California court 
19 of appeal panel, Jennings against Superior ~ourt. In Jennin~ , 
20 the police officer arrested a man pursuant to a San Francisco 
21 municipality ordinance which prohibited obstruction of 
22 public passageways. They put him in the police car and 
23 took him to the station. While that happened, he secreted 
24 in the rear seat of the police car 20 balloons of heroin. 
25 The court suppressed the evidence. They say they agree, 
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1 nothing wrong with what the police officer did, he acted 
2 unlawfully. Unfortunately, the San Francisco Board of 
3 Supervisors didn't. The ordinance was unconstitutional 
4 as enacted, and therefore the evidence goes out. Why? 
5 Impairs judicial integrity. Unbelievable. The court thinks 
6 the enchanced judicial integrity by suppressing the truth. 
7 I mean, it's almost incomprehensible. 
8 Only last term the US Supreme Court reached the 
9 exact opposite conclusion on the exact same question. But 
10 the California court says aha, the California State Constitu-
11 tion describes a more exacting standard. That's true so 
12 far as the right of privacy is concerned. But the imperative 
13 judicial integrity doctrine is not a constitutional doctrine 
14 in the first place. It's got nothing -- it has no constitu-
15 tiona! face, and the guys that invented it, Justice Brandeis 
16 and Justice Holmes and Olmstead, expressly said it was 
17 not a constitutional document. That's why Holmes could 
18 use it in Silverthorne because Silverthorne was not a consti-
19 tutional case. It was a federal case involving federal 
20 supervisorial powers. 
21 Well, apart from that, Jennings has -- some of 
22 it's guarded, because the imperative judicial integrity 
23 referred to was it was not judges self respect. It refers 
24 to public respect for the courts. And Brandeis said that 
25 and Holmes said, and Trainer said that, and Cahan, right? 
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1 And as I've suggested to this committee before, anybody 
2 who thinks that public respect for the courts is enhanced 
3 by expressing the truth in courtrooms ought to be willing 
4 to put the exclusionary rule on the ballot. But you won't 
5 find one of them that will. And the reason is simple: 
6 As Professor Kaplan down at Stanford pointed out, people 
7 reject it. They reject it. Because one of the essential 
8 elements of our sense of justice is portionality. And 
9 the rule offends that. Because the most reliable and the 
10 most incriminating evidence is excluded. And the most 
11 good faith, most reasonable intrusion is minimal intrustion 
1l into privacy. And in California, because of the vicarious 
13 exclusionary rule, often enough the privacy invaded is 
14 not even the defendant's. 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: How often? 
16 MR. THOMPSON: No one knows statistically. And 
17 it doesn't really matter. I can give you plenty of examples, 
18 but time doesn't permit. But instead of that, I want to 
19 take exception to the notice -- obviously, we are getting 
20 comparative arguments all the time. But what about the 
2 1 statistics? Nobody had those statistics when Mapp vs. Ohio 
22 was announced, or when the Cahan rule was imposed. No 
23 one had produced those statistics for charging the law 
24 then. What we do now remains something of a mystery to 
25 me. But I don't think-- I agree with one thing that has 
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been said by one of my predeces~ors. There's a difference 
between the reality of the administration of the criminal 
justice system and the public reception. And the public 
reception doe~ not depend upon the run of the mill cases. 
The public perception, which I think is important to mainten-
ance of the administration of criminal justice depends 
on visible cases on the tip of the iceberg. And the tip 
of the iceberg is the Corona case with their 25 bodies, 
and evidence has been suppressed. It was no answer to 
say, "Well, wait a minute. You don't have enough cases." 
Well, it's more than that, I suppose. Not only 
is there a disproportionality of the rule, but this Berkeley 
law dean, Barrett, once put it very simply: · It's not the 
court which excludes evidence to avoid condoning the -acts 
of the officer; by the same token, not condoning the illegal 
acts of the defendant. That's not a-- in a sense, that's 
a rhetorical question. Any answer that you get, no matter 
how unpalatable that answer may be, that answer is yes. 
Now I'm really troubled by this imperative, because 
you are not being told where it leads. It leads to a rule. 
That it doesn't matter that the illegal search was made 
by the police. It could be made by you or you or you or 
me. If we illegally detain somebody right now, out from 
our neighbor's house, where we hear we crash, bang, and 
the elderly lady is there, and we grab the guy, if you 
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1 believe the integrity of the judiciary is the bottom of 
2 the exclusionary rule, then you must exclude evidence in 
3 that case. Because it is absolutely no deterrent, and 
4 we are practically inviting and immunizing people by having 
5 their friends search their houses. Now if you think that's 
6 far fetched, I invite your attention to the dissenting 
7 opinion written by the first witness here today, and in 
8 re. Brian S. That's too new to give you a citation to 
9 it, but it's in these slip sheets. And that's exactly 
10 what it concludes. That's exactly what it concludes. The 
11 problem with the imperative is that it confuses whether 
12 or not the courts are created for the judges, or for the 
. 
13 litigants. Maxwell vs. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3rd, 
14 happily they granted a hearing in this one. I want to 
15 quote one sentence which I think illustrates the problem 
16 and the imperative: 
17 "To reverse the trial court's order 
18 removing Maxwell's lawyers would elevate 
19 Maxwell's right to be represented by lawyers 
20 of his choice above the principle of the 
21 preservation of judicial integrity." 
22 Can you imagine Maxwell's gall, thinking he should 
23 have a lawyer of his choice that he can pay for, when it 
24 would interfere with the judges' concept of their own self 
25 respect. 
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1 Well, California has gone so far. That we even 
2 applied the exclusionary rule where what the police have 
3 done is within the law. What they did no more than the 
4 law allows under the "think right" and as to the People 
5 against Miller. It's not enough that the police officer 
6 invade privacy only to the extent that the sentences permitte . 
7 His thought processes must be error free. If he has probable 
8 cause to arrest for one offense, but mistakenly arrests 
9 another one, the arrest is bad. And any incidental search 
10 is bad. Not surprisingly, the federal rule is different. 
11 And I want to mention one other thing that I mentioned 
12 to the committee one other time. I am troubled by the 
13 double standard the courts have applied in this respect 
14 to the cops and then to themselves. If the cop does the 
15 right thing for the wrong reason, he's wrong, and the evidenc 
16 is inadmissible. If the trial judge admits evidence for 
17 the wrong reason, the evidence remains admissible, the 
18 ruling is upheld, if only the appellate court or the Attorney 
19 General's Office can think of a right reason. Now what 
20 kind of a rule is that? Why the distinction? And it's 
21 not academic. This case -- I want to end on this case, 
22 because it's another opinion by the first witness here 
23 today, called in re. Melvin L .. Officers patrolling a 
24 six square block area. There have been 25 to 30 burglaries 
25 in the last five days. They see a 15 to 16 year old juvenile 
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1 walking down the street with a suitcase. They know 15 
2 to 20 percent of the burglaries, they do it with suitcases. 
3 So they stop their patrol car and say aha, let's go talk 
4 to him. As they approach the juvenile, they note protruding 
5 from the suitcase, fur. They see it sticking out of his 
6 jacket a camera. And ultimately they question him, get 
7 any incriminating information, and leads to his arrest. 
8 Bad arrest. Why? Well, the police could not consider 
9 the fur sticking out of the suitcase or the camera sticking 
10 out of the coat, because they had already decided to talk 
11 to the guy before they had seen him. Now the objective 
12 circumstances presented to the officers before they make 
13 any invasion into that juvenile's rights justified what 
14 they did. Oddly enough, what they found in there was jewelry 
15 cameras, watches, and two handguns, one of which is loaded. 
16 Is that the kind of rule we want? I hope not. That's 
17 not the kind of rule I want to live with. 
18 A couple of years after Cahan, Justice Traynor 
19 wrote in a famous law review article: 
20 "If we keep in mind the original 
21 detra of the Exclusionary Rule is a deter-
22 renee of law's enforcement of law, we 
23 can guard against the confusion in the 
24 attendant rules we develop." 
25 We failed. Now I think that's within the province 
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1 of the Legislature to extricate us, I think, because when 
2 Justice Traynor adopted the exclusionary rule in Cahan, 
3 he did not do it as a matter of federal constitutional 
4 law, or a matter of state constitutional law, but as a 
5 rule of evidence. And he did that, that was no accident. 
6 He did not overlook the California Constitution, because 
7 13 years earlier in Gonzales he had rejected the exclusionary 
8 rule saying at that time that California is of course free 
9 to construe its own constitution. He did it so it could 
10 be changed. You have that power. The court has never, 
11 never made the exclusionary rule a state constitutional 
12 requirement. Has not done that to date. And I think that 
13 in light of what we are going to have in the federal rule 
14 and the statute here, that it could change things. It's 
15 no answer to say that anything we did would be academic 
16 and moot, because the court has ultimate responsibility. 
17 Mr. Chairman, rather than take other people's 
18 time, I would just tell you that if the committee desires, 
19 there are 13 different reasons why the GAO study is irrelevan 
20 in California, and I'm willing to 
21 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Why don't you send us a letter 
22 pointing out your reasons --
23 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 
24 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: -- it's g_oing to be published 
25 and distributed throughout the state. 
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1 MR. THOMPSON: Thanks very much. 
2 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thanks very much for your 
3 testimony. 
4 Next we have Jim Tucker from the American Civil 
5 Liberties Union. 
6 MR. TUCKER: Mr. Chairman, members, my name is 
7 Jim Tucker from the American Civil Liberties Union. I 
8 will make my comments very brief. I just want to make 
9 a couple points. 
10 Unfortunately, most of the witnesses, I think 
11 particularly those who seem to have some ill at ease with 
12 the Fourth Amendment, have not really approached the problem 
13 in terms of how they can make the Fourth Amendment more 
14 effective. In one way or another, they are really suggesting 
15 to you ways in which we can make the Fourth Amendment meaning 
16 less. It's not surprising that representatives of the 
17 executive, both the Attorney General and the prosecutors, 
18 would come forward and ask for more power. That's a general 
19 tendency that everyone has, is to expand their bailiwick 
20 and to get for themselves discretion that they sincerely 
21 believe in reasonable good faith that they will not abuse. 
22 Unfortunately, that is inconsistent with the kind of governme~t 
23 we have chosen to adopt, and that we worked with now for 
24 200 years. 
25 Obviously, there are things about the exclusionary 
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rule that are unpopular. Particularly, I think, if you 
put to a vote the issue of whether certain racial groups, 
certain minority groups, certain economic groups, should 
be subject to more government power than other groups. 
I imagine a lot of people would say sure, go ahead and 
you can set up your government entities down there in Watts 
or East Los Angeles or whatever. But just don't do it 
in our back yard. And one of the purposes of an organization 
like ours, and unfortunately, I think, it should be a purpose 
of particularly prosecutors, but it's a function that they 
have chosen pretty much to ignore, is to instill in the 
public the importance of the kinds of checks that we have 
in the Fourth Amendment. 
I think it's interesting if you follow the thread 
of the discussion so far, what you will see is that a strong 
man has been put up, and then a solution . has been proposed. 
And what is that strong man? The strong man is that this 
rule is designed to punish someone. Well, it's not designed 
to punish someone. It's not designed to punish a police 
officer or police department or anybody else. It's designed 
as a limit on government power. It's a limit. So that 
that makes the good faith, or whatever, the state of mind 
of the police officer, of the executive, or anybody in 
the government, that's irrelevant. If they're standing 
in your front room one day, all those police officers, 
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1 and they said hey, you know, we're here. We have good 
2 faith. We're here and your neighbor said you have got 
3 some guns in the house. So we're here to search. One-
4 hundred percent cross our hearts and hope to die, we're 
5 here based on reasonable good faith. We don't want to 
6 impinge on your rights. You don't care why they're there. 
7 And the constitution doesn't say your home should be subject 
8 to good faith kinds of intrusions. The whole purpose of 
9 the structure was to say look, these are limitations beyond 
10 which the government cannot intrude. 
11 Now that distinction also is not understood by 
12 the prosecutors and the Attorney General when they talk 
13 about the trial. The trial is not a truth finding process. 
14 The trial is a process of determining within very specific 
15 limitations placed upon the government who committed a 
16 particular act. If we wanted a truth finding process, 
17 we could obviously think of a number of kinds of things 
18 that would get at the quote unquote truth, including monitori g 
19 people's homes, televisions on streetcorners, televisions 
20 in people's homes, et cetera. That would tell us what's 
21 going on. But we have never been willing so far to pay 
22 the price of that kind of loss of personal privacy to the 
23 government. So when they deposit this thing about the 
24 poor officer, he doesn't understand this and he doesn't 
25 understand that, and then he's being punished. It seems 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 




























to me that they're setting up an equation that obviously 
dictates one answer, when the real equation is not in terms 
of the personal officer's good faith or the good faith 
of the whole department. It's whether or not the government 
should have certain power and certain authority. And obvious y 
we think that they should not. The prosecutors, of course, 
want to have such discretion, possibly. 
Now in terms of the good faith proposal, I think 
that if you think about it for more than about two minutes, 
it's obvious that it's a ludicrous proposal. First of 
all, if the thing that it's supposed to cure is the complexit 
of the law, obviously it's not going to cure that. Every 
court is going to have to decide when is this officer acting 
in good faith, and when is he not. Now they have added 
the word, "reasonable good faith." So now all the courts 
are going to have to run around interpreting reasonable 
good faith. 
Take Justice Jefferson's example. The officer 
who stops the black person and you know, the teenager who 
is not in school during the day. The police officer will 
tell you that now there's a candidate who is most likely 
to be a burglar. He's not in school, he's a truant, they 
can't pick him up for truancy anymore because their hands 
are tied. So they have no reason to pick him up, but they 
know he's a burglar. They have pretty good reason to believe 
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1 he's a burglar. So they stop him. 
2 Now Justice Jefferson I think brought up this 
3 example because those officers are going to testify: Look, 
4 based on my experience and working in Watts for 20 years, 
5 I can tell you that guy looks like a crook. I mean, it's 
6 the way he walks, it's the way he talks, it's the bulges 
7 in his pockets, it's the way he has his hair, whatever 
8 you want to say. He says, I know, I've been there. I've 
9 worked there for 20 years. 
10 Now again, we get back to this issue of well, 
11 are we going to punish that officer? No, we're not going 
12 to punish that officer. What we're going to say to him 
13 is look, this is probably the tip of the iceberg. In 
14 this case you have found out something. You searched him, 
15 you stopped him, you found some contraband, that's why 
16 this case is in court. How many other people have you 
17 stopped for the same reason and you never found anything 
18 on them? And ultimately, after keeping him for an hour 
19 or two hours on the street, and questioning him and running 
20 warrants on him and everything else you can think of, you 
21 let him go. 
22 Now the re·ason for this kind of rule is to say 
23 look, we believe that this is probably and I think that 
24 any honest person who has worked in the criminal justice 
25 system would tell you that every one of these searches 
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1 that you see in court is the tip of the iceberg. It's 
Z an occasion of what that officer is doing in a number of 
3 other cases that never get to the courts. It's an occasion 
4 of the number of times they stop anybody they want to on 
5 the street, and the courts are saying in interpreting 
6 our constitution, they are saying, "Look, you are not suppose 
7 to do that. This is a limitation on you, as the representati e 
8 of the executive and as the representative of the government. 
9 Time out, you can't go any farther. That's it." So you 
10 know, you hope that we are not misled when they keep suggesti~g 
11 this poor officer, whoever he may be, who is just trying 
12 to do his job. And that's fine. He may be the most well 
13 meaning person in the world, as were the British when they 
14 were trying to keep together their empire by requiring 
15 some people to pay their tax. I'm sure they're intentions 
16 were the best in the world. But we set up a system that 
17 said, "I don't care what their intentions are. They can't 
18 do this kind of thing." 
19 Now if the good faith defense does not deal with 
20 the complexity of the law, and I submit that it will not, 
21 because the appellate courts are going to say, well this 
22 is unreasonable, that's reasonable, this officer was clearly 
23 lying, that officer wasn't lying. And then what is it 
24 really going to do? And I would submit to you that what 
25 the prosecutors are proposing to you is the only political 
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1 option, political option that they have. They can't take 
2 on the police. I mean, that's a political reality. And 
3 I'm sure they admit that privately, if they don't want 
4 to admit it publicly. The last thing a prosecutor wants, 
5 running for office, is to be opposed by every local police 
6 agency, okay? They can't take on the police. They can't 
7 take on the constitution, because they still have to at 
8 least maintain the appearance that they support the constitu-
9 tion. So that leaves one, only one alternative, and that's 
10 what they are suggesting. "Let's water it down. Let's 
11 make it as meaningless as possible," and that's the impact 
12 of the proposals that they have submitted. Is to make 
13 it as meaningless as possible. To extend the power of 
14 government to intrude in the lives of individuals, and 
15 if you notice as they present the factual situations, it's 
16 always that he turned out to be a pimp, and he had guns 
17 on him, and he did this and he did that. That's the case 
18 that they want to use to inflame the public. They don't 
19 want to talk about all the people out there that have been 
20 stopped by the police for no reason whatsoever, except 
21 the cop had this feeling in his stomach that that wasn't 
22 a nice person. They don't want to talk about those cases. 
23 And I just want to end with one thing that I think it's 
24 really unfortunate in these kinds of hearings, and it's 
25 probably the public climate in general. Hopefully someday 
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we will begin to have a discussion why aren't the prosecutors 
doing something about the problems of police abuse? Rather 
than coming forward and being the proponents of broader 
discretion for the police, where are the prosecutors in 
terms of dealing with those cases that they tell you privatelT 
and tell me privately. That is, they know there are certain 
officers that get in the stand and they lie every time. 
The cop that says, "Yeah, it was midnight, there were no 
streelights, and I could see his eyes were pinpointed from 
a hundred yards." 
Now that officer is lying. And you tell me a 
prosecutor who has within his department a group set up 
to investigate police who lie in these cases. You point 
out to me one prosecution, or attempted prosecution of 
an officer who has lied in a case involving search and 
seizure. And I would submit to you I certainly have never 
heard of one, and I have never seen one, and ! · would suspect 
that they don't exist. And if they tried to form such 
an agency within their own group, the police again would 
be out picketing them and all the things the police do 
to keep it down. So I think that somewhere, and it's not 
going to happen now, it's not going to happen in the next 
couple of years, but obviously groups like ourselves are 
going to keep speaking out until someone begins to understand 
that the crisis here is not a crisis of the exclusionary 
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1 rule being abused, it's the crisis of police and prosecutors 
2 who have too much discretion already, and are attempting 
3 to seek more by generating, really, a publicity campaign. 
4 And that's the relevance of the factual things, and that's 
5 why they don't want to discuss it particularly, is because 
6 of course, actually speaking, if you look at the conviction 
7 rates, if you look at the number of times that exclusionary 
8 motions are granted, it's obviously not a big problem for 
9 prosecutors or police. Their hands aren't tied. But it's 
10 a convenient political issue that they are going to use 
11 as much as possible. And that's why it's interesting to 
12 see their proposal is, "Well, let's dump it in the supreme 
13 court. Let's do something." On the one hand, Mr. Van De Ka p 
14 was saying, "Well, we all know how liberal the State Supreme 
15 Court is, and we know how they are going to come out on 
H5 these decisions ... And then when he's asked, well how will 
17 they decide on the constitutionality of this bill as far 
18 as vicarious liability, all of a sudden they're saying, 
19 "Gee, I don't know," you know? 
20 The court isn't their court, and they're going 
2 1 to listen to all these opinions and come up with a conclusion 
22 Obviously, the political strategy is to dump this issue 
23 in the court. As soon as the court says, "Vicarious liabilit 
24 is out," bang. There goes Richardson, there goes the whole 
25 machinery, computers start whirring, and they start sending 
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1 this stuff out. There are the justices who knocked out 
2 vicarious liability so that the criminals can be running 
3 on the streets tomorrow. And I would hope that the committee 
4 any members see the transcripts next year, are aware of 
5 the importance that they are performing in terms of not 
6 letting that kind of a political move, and I emphasize 
7 "political" occur in the guise of trying to bring about 
8 a reform in an area that I would submit that reforms need 
9 to be made in the other way. 
10 One last comment. From the Los Angeles Times, 
11 November 30, 1979. They did an editorial defending the 
12 recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court applying 
13 the exclusionary rule, and they made one last point that 
14 I think emphasizes the point I am trying to make. They 
15 talk about the high standard that is being imposed on law 
16 enforcement. It says: 
17 "This is a high standard to impose, 
18 but if the balance and difficult cases 
19 involving the citizens' rights has to 
20 be tipped one way or the other, it's wise 
21 to tip it in favor of the Fourth Amendment, 
22 which stands as a barrier between the 
23 individual and the power of the state." 
24 And I would hope that that barrier between the 
25 individual and the power of the state is not weakened, 
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1 which their proposals would do, but in fact is strengthened, 
2 and hopefully will reach a time in the Legislature where 
3 there is interest in strengthening that kind of bearing. 
4 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
5 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you very much, 
6 ~ir. Tucker. 
7 We have two final witnesses. Next we have 
8 Mr. Maurice Oppenheim from the Criminal Law Section of 
9 the California State Bar. 
10 MR. OPPENHEIM: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
11 members of the committee. Of course I will keep my remarks 
12 short. 
13 I would like to say that I have been a prosecutor 
14 since 1960, and my views obviously are not going to be 
15 shared by the overwhelming majority of prosecutors, because 
16 I support the exclusionary rule. I want to indicate to 
17 you --
18 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Mr. Oppenheim, are your views 
19 with the intent to deal with the Section of the State Bar, 
20 or your own personal views? 
21 MR. OPPENHEIM: These are the views of the State 
22 Bar, Criminal Law Section, which although I would assume, 
23 also it is fair to tell you that most of the prosecutors 
24 on the State Bar executive committee would probably be 
25 in favor of it. But less in terms of the overall membership 
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1 of the executive committee, we have taken positions supportin 
2 the exclusionary rule. 
3 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you. 
4 MR. OPPENHEIM: I think you must understand that 
5 when people start talking about deterrence, that there 
6 should not be a period after that word in terms of the 
7 purpose of the rule. The purpose of the rule was quite 
8 clearly expressed in H:eks, and it's very, very simple. 
9 If letters and private documents can thus be seized and 
10 held and used in evidence against the citizen accused of 
11 an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring 
12 his right to be secure against such searches and seizures 
13 is of no value, and so as far as those thus placed are 
14 concerned, might well be striken from the constitution. 
15 That's the ultimate purpose. And the rest of it is kind 
16 of intermediary kinds of purposes that are involved. So 
17 that's what you have to keep in mind. And that means that 
18 when you start talking about good faith, that doesn't count 
19 for anything. If the search is unreasonable, the Fourth 
20 Amendment demands the evidence be excluded. 
21 I want to give you a very short history, very, 
22 very short. Weeks, as we know, held that illegally seized 
23 evidence was not admissible in the federal court. The 
24 next important decision was Wolf vs. Colorado, the finding 
25 in 1948, which refused to apply the rule to states, saying 
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1 to the states, "We will give you a little bit of time to 
2 clean up your act." Perhaps exclusion isn't the only remedy. 
3 And we want to see. What did the states do? Didn't do 
4 a damn thing. In Mapp vs. Ohio, 1961, the United States 
5 Superior Court finally blew the whistle, said, "You haven't 
6 done anything, it appears you are not going to do anything, 
7 and therefore we are going to apply the rule against states 
8 as well through the Fourteenth Amendment." So when you 
9 talk about giving people the chance, and other matters 
10 that are concerned, history has given them that chance. 
11 Where are we now? 
12 I want to talk for a few minutes about why the 
13 proposal suggested concerning modification just won't work. 
14 And in a sense, what you are being asked to do is to say 
15 you are going to follow the rules of the United States 
16 Supreme Court, but the California Legislature also will 
17 take a part in it. I would suggest to you that for the 
18 California Legislature to try and define the term "reasonable 
19 with regard to search and seizure, would be as successful 
20 as if the California Legislature tried to further define 
21 reasonable doubt. It is not the kind of issue that can 
22 be handled in a meaningful and intelligent manner by a 
23 legislative body any more than you could, for example, 
24 try and define all of the fact patterns that would constitute 
25 self defense. Well, some might say, "Okay, if that's true, 
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why doesn't California say, 'well, we'll get rid of our 
clause and we'll let the United States Supreme Court totally 
handle the situation.'" 
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I think 
that is the worst possible exclusion that could ever have 
happened. 
There is another constitutional principle that's 
involved here that really never gets talked about. That's 
the Doctrine of Federalism. When our constitution was 
adopted, and the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and 
1787, the Doctrine of Federalism said that we are going 
to create, at that time, 13 independent laboratories which 
were to be the colonies. And by adopting various kinds 
of solutions to problems, that would be the best way to 
test of the long run, perhaps, what would be best. That's 
not a doctrine that ought to be abandoned. We now have 
50 or 51 or whatever independent laboratories. The Doctrine 
of Eederalism is one of the most fundamental doctrines 
that there is. And for California to abandon its rule 
as one of the independent laboratories, would indeed be 
a sorry, sorry day. I suggest to you, therefore, that 
the solution proposed ought to be rejected. 
I want to make one or two or three more comments, 
if I could just have just a few more minutes. 
CHAI~~N McVITTIE: Sure. 
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1 MR. OPPENHEIM: About some of the other solutions 
2 that have been suggested. 
3 The one mentioned by Chief Justice Burger, which 
4 in effect proposes some kind of compensation for such viola-
5 tions, I think that, too, ought to be asked, and let us 
6 see where it leads. 
7 Does that mean, for example, we are now going 
8 to admit, because after all, the first departure from princip e 
9 is the easiest one to take, and the one that really ought 
10 to be resisted with utmost vigor, because the second sin 
11 is much easier to commit than the first one. But does 
12 that mean that we are going to compensate people, for example 
13 for search and seizure rules? The next step is to say 
14 that you are going to be able to beat a confession out 
15 of somebody so long as it is true, provided you pay his 
16 doctor bills. Or does it mean that you are going to be 
17 allowed to burn books, provided you pay for the cost of 
18 the paper? I think that the constitution ought to be treated 
19 very gingerly, and that these ideas ought to be thoroughly 
20 explored. And as therefore I do not think Chief Justice 
21 Burger's solution is a proper one, either. 
22 Where does that leave us? Not in, perhaps, too 
23 good of shape, but after all, I think we must realize that 
24 regardless of the situation, that the search and seizure 
25 rule in terms of overall criminal justice and procedure, 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE. SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 



























doesn't mean that crimes are going to go unpunished or 
anything else. Indeed, I would suggest that in terms of 
a lot of things, it's very miniscule. 
There is another side to the search and seizure 
thing, too. I would suggest to you that based on my experi-
ence, it has occurred that the requirements of search and 
seizure have actually produced better evidence and more 
evidence than can be used substantively. You won't find 
police officers, and you won't find district attorneys 
presenting that side of the argument to you, because often-
times the necessary requirements to get search and seizure 
evidence, the police then come up with other things that 
can then be admitted upon the true issue of guilty or inno-
cence. So there is that side, also. 
In conclusion, I want to say that what I deem 
to be the real problem when you strip away the political 
rhetoric, when you strip away the adversary rhetoric, and 
when you strip away what everybody has come, the real problem 
they have presented to you today, when they suggest the 
various holdings of the cases, it really boils down to 
what's reasonable, and what's unreasonable. That's where 
it's all at. And in that sense, what you're talking about 
is certainly judicial opinions. And there isn't any system 
that's people proof. Whether it be the judiciary, whether 
it be the Legislature, whether it be the prosecution, or 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
7700 COLLEGE TOWN DRIVE, SUITE 209 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95826 
TELEPHONE (91 6) 383-3601 
116 
1 whether it be the defense. And I do not know any solution 
2 to that particular problem. 
3 One final comment, if the committee please, with 
4 regard to the idea of simply saying because a magistrate 
5 signed a piece of paper, that that automatically stamps 
6 it forever inviolate and unsalable, to me also ignores 
7 the problem involved with people and with the judicial 
8 selection system and everything else. Because I could 
9 go to the magistrate and the City of Los Angeles and the 
10 County of Los Angeles and sign almost anything for whatever 
11 reason. It may well be that some of them now feel and 
11 rely on what's known as the principle of collective non-· 
13 responsibility, figuring it's easy to sign it and let the 
14 next guy up the line toss it out. And there is some of 
15 that that goes on. It's human nature. So that I don't 
16 suggest that that be a good approach. Indeed, I suppose 
17 I could cite a case that you folks remember up there in 
18 Sacramento where there was a 155 page affidavit submitted 
19 to some magistrate. Number one, he didn't read it all; 
10 and number two, some of the pages there wasn't any printing 
11 on them. And he signed it anyway. That's not to say that 
12 all magistrates are bad. Certainly they're not all bad; 
13 they are not all good. But they're people. And there 
14 just isn't any answer to it. And I suggest that in our 
15 democratic society there are some things we have to bear, 
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1 and that the price we pay for trying to change small things 
2 may be well too ·great, if what we're going to really destroy 
3 in the long run is the constitution that has held together 
4 for 200 years. Crime has been here for 200 years, it may 
5 well be here for the next 200 years. But I would like 
6 to see the constitution be there, also. 
7 Thank you. 
8 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Thank you very much, 
9 Mr. Oppenheim. 
10 Our final witness today is Miss Judy Allen, from 
11 the State Public Defender's Office. 
12 MS. ALLEN: Thank you very much. One of the 
13 benefits or the disadvantages of being last is that everybody 
14 has already said everything that you wanted to say, which 
15 is about where I find myself. So I would just like to 
16 say that the State Public Defender's position has been 
17 aptly presented by both Mr. Cleary and Mr. Tucker, and 
18 we are in total agreement with the remarks presented by 
19 both of those people. 
20 There is just one small point I would like to 
21 reiterate, and that, as you know, our office does see the 
22 flow of criminal appeals to the appellate courts. And 
23 within those appeals, relatively few of those cases actually 
24 involve a search and seizure issue at all. And if a search 
25 and seizure issue has been litigated at the trial court 
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1 level, quite infrequently in fact, more frequently than 
2 not, it's not even raised on appeal, because it's clear 
3 the trial court's holding in the matter, which is generally 
4 a denial of the 1538 is correct. In those cases that it's 
5 raised by the defendant, it is extraordinarily unusual 
6 to have the case, or the denial of 1538 reversed. Occasional y 
7 it happens. 
8 On the other side of that it is also the people 
9 who are appealing the granting of 1538.5, and on perhaps 
10 a similarly proportionate level, their appeals are reversed, 
11 which means of course that the 1538 was incorrectly granted. 
12 Unless the committee has any questions regarding 
13 the appellate process or that area, I will close my remarks. 
14 CHAIRMAN McVITTIE: Fine. Thank you very much. 
15 Is there any member of the public who would like 
16 to testify here? 
17 All right. Let the record show there are no 
18 further witnesses. Thank you very much for coming. The 
19 transcript should be ready within 60 to 90 days. 
20 The meeting is ·adjourned. 
21 (Thereupon this session before the Assembly 
22 Committee on Criminal Justice adjourned at 
23 5:00 p.m.) 
24 
25 
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John K. Van de Kamp, District Attorney 
Los Angeles County 
Before the Assembly Committee on Crim.inal Justice 
Hearings on the Exclusionary Rule 
Monterey, California 
Monday, September 29, 1980 
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS, 
THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YO-
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE --A RULE ADOPTED 25 YEARS AGO BY 
OUR STATE. I WOULD LIKE TODAY BRIEFLY TO LOOK AT THE HOPES 
AND PURPOSES THAT OUR SUPREME COURT IN PEOPLE V. CAHAN, 
44 C. 2d 434, HELD WHEN THEY ADOPTED THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
IN OUR STATE, TO SEE HOW CALIFORNIA HAS CARRIED OUT THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN COMPARISON WITH THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND FINALLY TO SUGGEST AT LEAST ONE SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA 
I FEEL WE ARE FACED WITH UNDER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN 
CALIFORNIA. 
AS YOU KNOW, IT WAS IN CAHAN THAT THE CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT ADOPTED THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. CAHAN, 
TOGETHER WITH 15 OTHER PERSONS ,WAS CHARGED WITH BOOKMAKING 
AND RELATED OFFENSES. MUCH OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS WAS OBTAINED, IN THE COURT'S WORDS, "IN FLAGRANT 
VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ••• , THE CALIFORNIA 
CONSTITUTION ••• , AND STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES • 11 MOST 
OF THE INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED BY NUMEROUS 
UNAUTHORIZED FORCIBLE ENTRIES INTO HOMES. DOORS WERE 
KICKED DOWN AND WINDOWS WERE KNOCKED OUT IN ORDER TO 
GAIN ENTRY AT SOME LOCATIONS. 
THE COURT FOUND THAT THE POLICE "· •• FRANKLY 
ADMIT THEIR DELIBERATE, FLAGRANT ACTS IN VIOLATION OF 
BOTH CONSTITUTIONS {U.S. AND CALIFORNIA) AND THE LAWS 
ENACTED THEREUNDER." IN CAHAN, THE COURT WAS CONCERNED 
THAT SUCH UNREASONABLE ACTS BY POLICE OFFICERS BE DETERRED 
AND THAT THE COURTS NOT BE REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN 
AND, IN EFFECT, CONDONE SUCH LAWLESS ACTIVITY. 
IN ADOPTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE,. THE COURT IN 
CAHAN SAID, 11WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE CONTENTION THAT 
THE FEDERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS BEEN ARBITRARY IN ITS 
APPLICATION AND HAS INTRODUCED NEEDLESS CONFUSION INTO 
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 11 
BUT, THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SAID THAT WON'T 
HAPPEN HERE. WE DO NOT HAVE TO FOLLOW THE FEDERAL CASES. 
CAHAN SAID, AND AGAIN I QUOTE, "IF THE FEDERAL CASES INDICATE 
NEEDLESS LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT REASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OR TO SECURE WARRANTS, THIS COURT IS 
FREE TO REJECT THEM." FURTHER, "THE ADOPTION OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE NEED NOT INTRODUCE CONFUSION INTO THE 
LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. INSTEAD, IT OPENS THE DOOR TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKABLE RULES GOVERNING SEARCHES 










CAHAN ALSO PREDICTED THAT WHERE THE SEARCH OR SEIZURE 
MAY. INVOLVE ONLY MINOR INTRUSIONS OF PRIVACY OR RESULT FROM 
GOOD FAITH MISTAKES OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF POLICE 
OFFICERS I "THERE IS NO REASON I OF COURSE I WHY I IF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY _RULE IS ADOPTED, APPROPRIATE EXCEPTIONS COULD 
NOT BE DEVELOPED TO GOVERN THESE LATTER SITUATIONS." 
HAVE THE GOALS OF CAHAN, SO ELOQUENTLY STATED BY 
JUSTICE TRAYNOR, BEEN MET? IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, 
IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO ASK, WHY DOES ART BELL'S COMPENDIUM 
ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE HAVE SO MANY PAGES AND SUCH SMALL 
PRINT AND SUCH FREQUENT REVISIONS AND THREE DIFFERENT 
COLORS OF TYPE? 
IT IS MY OPINION AND THAT OF MANY PROSECUTORS IN 
CALIFORNIA THAT THE GOALS OF CAHAN HAVE NOT BEEN MET, THAT 
ESPECIALLY IN CALIFORNIA THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS FAILED 
TO LIVE UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF THOSE WHO FRAMED IT. 
IT IS, AND HAS BEEN OF QUESTIONABLE EFFECTIVENESS IN 
DETERRING UNREASONABLE POLICE CONDUCT: AND THE RULES 
GOVERNING S-EARCH AND SEIZURE HAVE BECOME SO COMPLEX AND 
CHANGE SO FREQUENTLY THAT NO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 
CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO KNOW THEM IN THEIR ENTIRETY. 
THIS IS ALSO TRUE OF THE RULES GOVERNING ARREST, CONFESSION, 
LINE-UPS, ETC., WHERE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ALSO COMES 
INTO PLAY. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
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ESPECIALLY IN CALIFORNIA, HAS IN MANY INSTANCES INFRINGED 
UPON THE PRIMARY GOAL OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL -- THE SEARCH 
FOR TRUTH-- FOR NO VALID REASON. 
LET ME MAKE A BRIEF COMPARISON OF SOME CALIFORNIA 
CASES AND SOME FEDERAL CASES AND SEE WHICH SYSTEM, IN 
THE WORDS OF CAHAN, HAS BEEN ARBITRARY, WHICH SYSTEM HAS 
INTRODUCED NEEDLESS CONFUSION, WHICH SYSTEM HAS PLACED 
NEEDLESS LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT REASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, WHICH SYSTEM HAS ATTEMPTED TO 
INTRODUCE WORKABLE RULES, WHICH SYSTEM HAS DEVELOPED 
EXCEPTIONS FOR MINOR INTRUSIONS OF PRIVACY AND GOOD FAITH 
MISTAKES OF JUDGMENT, AND FINALLY, WHICH SYSTEM HAS 
EXTENDED THE RULE FURTHEST BEYOND THE PURPOSE IT EXISTS 
TO SERVE. 
ONE COMPARISON THAT COMES TO MIND IS THAT PRESENTED 
BY UNITED STATES V. CREWS, 63 L.Ed. Zd 537, AND PEOPLE V. 
TERESINSKI, 26 C. 3d 457. (U.S. APP. PENDING) 
IN CREWS, THE VICTIM WAS ROBBED. THE POLICE ILLEGALLY 
ARRESTED THE DEFENDANT, TOOK PHOTOS AND HAD THE VICTIM 
IDENTIFY THE DEFENDANT FROM THE PHOTOS. LATER, AT TRIAL, 
THE VICTIM IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT IN THE COURT. THE 
COURT, IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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0~ 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE, EXCLUDED ALL PRODUCTS OF THE ARREST --
o_ NAMELY THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE PHOTO-






IDENTIFICATION BECAUSE THE MERE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT 
IN COURT AS THE RESULT OF THE ILLEGAL ARREST DID NOT JUSTIFY 
THE SUPPRESSION OF HIS FACE. 
CONTRASTED TO CREWS IS TERESINSKI, WHERE THE DEFENDANT 
AND HIS COMPANIONS WHO HAD, LIKE CREWS, JUST COMMITTED 
A ROBBERY,WERE ILLEGALLY STOPPED BECAUSE THE POLICE THOUGHT 
THERE WAS A CURFEW VIOLATION. AFTER STOPPING THE DEFENDANTS, 
THE POLICE REALIZED THEY WERE NOT MINORS, BUT THEY SAW 
LIQUID IN THE CAR, MADE THEM EXIT AND FOUND EVIDENCE OF THE 
ROBBERY. THE DEFENDANT WAS PHOTOGRAPHED AND THE VICTIM 
IDENTIFIED HIM FROM THE PHOTOS AND LATER IDENTIFIED THE 
DEFENDANT IN COURT. AFTER THE COURT FOUND THE ARREST 
ILLEGAL, A MOTION' WAS MADE TO SUPPRESS ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
INCLUDING THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION. THE CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT GRANTED THE MOTION TO EXCLUDE, INCLUDING 
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION. 
CALIFORNIA COURTS THUS SAY THAT A VICTIM'S MEMORY 
OF A CRIME AND OF THE CRIMINAL CANNOT BE PRESENTED IN COURT 
EVEN THOUGH THAT MEMORY WAS OBTAINED BEFORE THE DEFENDANT 
) .... WAS ARRESTED AND WAS OBTAINED WITHOUT ANY POLICE ACTION 
~ ·s v _ 
AT ALL. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DOES NOT ALLOW 
THE DEFENDANT TO PREVENT HIS VICTIM FROM IDENTIFYING HIM 
IN COURT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE THE VICTIM'S 
MEMORY OF THE CRIME AND THE VICTIM'S MEMORY OF THE DEFENDANT 
WERE NOT PRODUCED BY ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE POLICE . 
ANOTHER AREA OF COMPARISON INVOLVES THE QUESTION 
OF WHETHER ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE WILL BE EXCLUDED 
EVEN THOUGH ITS EXCLUSION ALLOWS THE DEFENDANT TO FREELY 
COMMIT PERJURY. IN HARRIS V. NEW YORK, 401 U.S. 222, THE COURT 
EXCLUDED THE USE OF STATEMENTS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF A 
MIRANDA VIOLATION FROM THE PROSECUTION'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
BUT THE COURT DID ALLOW THE USE OF THE EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH 
THE DEFENDANT, STATING, AND I QUOTE, 11EVERY CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT IS PRIVILEGED TO TESTIFY IN HIS. OWN DEFENSE OR 
TO REFUSE TO DO SO. BUT THAT PRIVILEGE CANNOT BE CONSTRUED 
TO INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO COMMIT PERJURY. 11 THE PROSECUTION 
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TRADITIONAL TRUTH-TESTING DEVICES ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. QUOTING AGAIN 1 "THE SHIELD PROVIDED BY 
MIRANDA CANNOT BE PERVERTED INTO A LICENSE TO USE PERJURY 
BY WAY OF A DEFENSE FREE FROM THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION 
WITl-1 l?RIOR . INCONSISTENT UTTERANCES." SIMILARLY 1 THE 
UNJTF.l) STATES SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES V. HAVENS, 
64 L.Ed. 2d 559, STATED, "THERE IS NO GAINSAYING THAT ARRIVING 
AT THE TRUTH IS A FUNDAMENTAL GOAL OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM ••• 
THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO TESTIFY TRUTHFULLY IS FULLY 
0-
BINDING ON HIM WHEN HE IS CROSS-EXAMINED. 11 
o .... IN CALIFORNIA, THE LAW IS TO THE CONTRARY. DEFENDANTS 
ARE ALLOWED TO COMMIT PERJURY WITH IMPUNITY WITHOUT FEAR 
OF IMPEACHMENT BY EARLIER CONFLICTING STATEMENTS MADE AS 
0- A RESULT OF A TECHNICAL MIRANDA VIOLATION. EVEN THOUGE 
CALIFORNIA, IN PEOPLE V. NUDD, 12 C.3d 204, FOLLOWED HARRLS 
AND CONDEMNED THE USE OF PERJURY IN OUR STATE'S COURTS, IT 
WAS OVERRULED LESS THAN ONE AND A HALF YEARS LATER BY 
PEOPLE V. DISBROW, 16 C.3d 101. ESSENTIALLY, THE CALIFORNIA 
- SUPREME COURT IN DISBROW ALLOWED A "LITTLE" PERJURY IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE PROSECUTOR TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT 
BY THE USE OF MIRANDA VIOLATIVE STATEMENTS. (SEE CHIEF 
JUSTICE WRIGHT 1S CONCURRING OPINION.) 
IN ANOTHER CONTRAST TO THE FEDERAL CASES, THE 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR -
POLICE OFFICERS TO BE SECURE WHEN THEY ARE REQUIRED TO 
TRANSPORT DEFENDANTS. IN GUSTAFSON V. FLORIDA, 414 U.s. 260, 
- AND UNITED STATES V. ROBINSON, 414 U.s. 218, THE COURT HELD THAT 
THE RIGHT TO SEARCH A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL 
CUSTODIAL ARREST WHILE BASED UPON THE NEED TO DISARM AND 
TO DISCOVER EVIDENCE DOES NOT DEPEND ON WHAT SOME COURT 
MAY LATER DECIDE WAS THE PROBABILITY IN A PARTICULAR 
- SITUATION THAT WEAPONS OR EVIDENCE WOULD IN FACT BE FOUND 
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ON THE SUSPECT. THE COURT HELD THAT THE LAWFUL ARREST 
ESTABLISHES THE AUTHORITY TO SEARCH, AND IN THE CASE OF A 
LAWFUL CUSTODIAL ARREST, "A FULL SEARCH OF THE PERSON IS 
NOT ONLY AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT, BUT IS ALSO A REASONABLE SEARCH UNDER 
THE AMENDMENT. 11 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTS FROM THE RULE OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT PROTECTING OUR POLICE OFFICERS IN 
THE FIELD AND IMPOSES MORE LIMITING RULES FOR SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES BASED UPON THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION. 
PEOPLE V. BRISENDINE, 13 C.3d 528, AND PEOPLE V. NORMAN, 
14 C.3d, 929, HOLD THAT IN A TRAFFIC ARREST A MERE PAT-DOWN 
OF THE SUSPECT FOR WEAPONS IS ALL THAT IS ALLOWED AND OBJECTS 
IN THE ARRESTEE 1S POSSESSION MAY NOT BE SEARCHED UNLESS 
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS THAT WEAPONS MAY BE FOUND THEREIN. 
JUSTICE BURKE'S DISSENT IN BRISENDINE. BRINGS HOME THE 
DANGERS OF THIS CALIFORNIA DECISION. "ROBINSON AND GUSTAFSON 
MANIFESTLY AFFORD GREATER PROTECTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS THAN DO SIMON AND THE MAJORITY OPINION." THE JUSTICE 
POINTS OUT, AND I QUOTE, "FOR EXAMPLE, UNDER ROBINSON AND 
GUSTAFSON, AN OFFICER MAY MAKE A FULL SEARCH OF A PERSON 
WHO IS PLACED UNDER CUSTODIAL ARREST, WHEREAS UNDER NEITHER 




THE CONTENTS OF A CIGARETTE BOX OR BOTTLE THAT IS IN THE 
POCKET OF SUCH A PERSON UNLESS THE OFFICER IS ABLE TO POINT 
TO SPECIFIC FACTS THAT SUPPORT A BELIEF THAT THE ARRESTEE 
IS ARMED WITH AN A7'YPICAL WEAPON (E.G., RAZOR BLADES OR 







OF FACTS INDICATING ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON THE SUBJECT. 
ALSO, ACCORDING TO THE MAJORITY, IF A FULL CUSTODY ARREST 
HAD BEEN MADE IN CALIFORNIA FOR THE OFFENSE INVOLVED IN 
ROBINSON, THE OFFICER WOULD HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO A PAT-DOWN 
PRIOR TO TRANSPORTING THE DEFENDANT IN THE PATROL VEHICLE. 
A PAT-DOWN, HOWEVER, MIGHT NOT HAVE REVEALED A CAREFULLY 
CONCEALED WEAPON (E.G. , A KNIFE BLADE SECRETED IN A BELT 
OR UNDER THE ARCH PRESERVER IN A SHOE). 11 
BECAUSE THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RU!."E IS TO DETER UNREASONABLE POLICE CONDUCT, THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT SEARCHES BY PRIVATE 
IND.LVIDUALS ARE NOT THE BASIS FOR SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE. BURDEAU 
V. MCDOWELL, 256 U.S. 465. BUT CALIFORNIA HAS RECENTLY TAKEN 
ANOTHER POSITION AND AGAIN DEPARTED FROM ITS PRIOR RULES 
AND FROM THE CASES HANDED DOWN BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT. IN PEOPLE V. ZELINSKI, 24 C.3d 357, A SHOPLIFTER AT 
ZODY'S WAS OBSERVED PUTTING A BLOUSE IN HER PURSE. SHE LEFT 
WITHOUT PAYING FOR THE BLOUSE. EMPLOYEES OF ZODY 1S THEN 
STOPPED THE DEFENDANT AND REMOVED THE BLOUSE AND A VIAL, 
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WHICH WAS ON TOP OF THE BLOUSE, FROM HER PURSE. THE 
EMPLOYEES THEN EXAMINED THE VIAL, REMOVED A BALLOON FROM 
THE BOTTLE, EXAMINED THE SUBSTANCE IN THE BALLOON AND THEN 
WAITED FOR THE POLICE. THE COURT FOUND THAT THE SEARCH 
WAS ILLEGAL AND, EVEN THOUGH CONDUCTED BY PRIVATE PERSONS, 
IT EXCLUDED THE EVIDENCE OF THE SEARCH. HENCE, THE STATE COULD 
NOT PROSECUTE THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE SOMEONE BEYOND ITS 
CONTROL TOOK EVIDENCE IN A MANNER THAT CALIFORNIA'S SUPREME 
COURT DID NOT AGREE WITH. 
SIMILARLY, IN THE AREA OF QUESTIONING BY DIFFERENT 
OFFICERS AS TO DIFFERENT CRIMES, THE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL 
CASES AGAIN SPLIT. IN MICHIGAN V. MOSLEY, 423 U.S. 96, THE 
DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN ROBBERIES, 
TAKEN TO THE POLICE STATION AND GIVEN HIS MIRANDA WARNINGS 
BY A ROBBERY DETECTIVE. THE DEFENDANT REFUSED TO DISCUSS, 
THE ROBBERIES AND THE QUESTIONING CEASED. LATER, A HOMICIDE 
DETECTIVE TOOK THE DEFENDANT TO THE HOMICIDE BUREAU, 
MIRANDIZED HIM, AND THE DEFENDANT MADE A STATEME~T 
IMPLICATING HIMSELF IN A MURDER. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT REAFFIRMED MIRANDA AND ADOPTED A FACTUAL TEST, 
STATING, 11THE ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS OBTAINED AFTER 
THE PERSON IN CUSTODY HAS DECIDED TO REMAIN SILENT DEPENDS 
UNDER MIRANDA ON WHETHER HIS 'RIGHT TO CUT OFF QUESTIONING' 
WAS 'SCRUPULOUSLY HONORED'." THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
. . 







ONLY AFTER THE PASSAGE OF A SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME AND 
THE PROVISION OF A FRESH SET OF WARNINGS AND FOUND THAT THE 
SECOND INTERROGATION WAS RESTRICTED TO A CRIME THAT HAD 
NOT BEEN A SUBJECT OF THE EARLIER INTERROGATION. 
CONTRARY IS PEOPLE V. PETTINGILL, 2.1 C.3d 2.31, WHERE 
THE DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY IN EUREKA FOR BURGLARY HAD 
REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE BURGLARY. BECAUSE EVIDENCE TIED 
THE DEFENDANT TO BURGLARIES IN SANTA BARBARA, SANTA BARBARA 
POLICE WENT TO EUREKA AND RE-MIRANDIZED THE DEFENDANT. 
AS A RESULT, THE DEFENDANT CONFESSED TO THE SANTA BARBARA 
BURGLARIES. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT CONCEDED THAT 
THE FACTS OF MOSELY AND PETTINGILL WERE 11ESSENTIALL Y THE 
SAME 11 AND REFUSED TO DISTINGUISH THEM. IN RULING ON ESSENTIALLY 
SIMILAR FACTS, THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE 
CONFESSION TO THE SANTA BARBARA POLICE OFFICERS WAS IN-
ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT VIOLATED MIRANDA. THUS, A FREE AND 
VOLUNTARY WAIVER WAS OF NO VALUE. THE RIGID CALIFORNIA 
RULE ALLOWS NO EXCEPTION EVEN THOUGH THE PURPOSE OF 
MIRANDA IS NOT VIOLATED. 
CALIFORNIA LAW HAS EVEN BROUGHT INTO DOUBT WHAT TYPE 
OF WARNING IS REQUIRED UNDER MIRANDA. IN IN RE MICHAEL C. , 
2.1 C .3d 471, THE CALIFORNIA COURT RULED THAT A CONFESSION TO 
MURDER AND ROBBERY SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE JUVENILE 
HAD ASKED TO SEE HIS PROBATION OFFICER. THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT REVIEWED THE CASE IN FARE V. MICHAEL C. , 442 
, , 
U.S. 707, BECAUSE THE CALIFORNIA COURT HAD BASED ITS DECISION 
ON FEDERAL CONSTIT:UTIONAL LAW. IN FARE, THE COURT REVERSED 
STATING THAT THE DENIAL OF A REQUEST TO SEE A PROBATION 
OFFICER IS NOT A PER SE VIOLATION OF MIRANDA. PERHAPS WHEN 
THE ISSUE ARISES AGAIN, OUR COURT WILL BASE THE ALTERATION 
OF MIRANDA ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS AND THEREFORE 
PRECLUDE A REVERSAL BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. 
TO ILLUSTRATE THE CONFUSION THAT SUCH OPINIONS BY OUR STATE 
SUPREME COURT ENGENDER, LOOK AT IN RE PATRICK W ,, 104 CA 3d 
615 {ACCEPTED FOR HEARING BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME 
COURT). IN IN RE PATRICK W., THE COURT SUPPRESSED A MURDER 
CONFESSION DESPITE THE FACT THE JUVENILE HAD BEEN READ 
AND FREELY WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. WHY WAS THE CONFESSION 
SUPPRESSED? BECAUSE THE POLICE DID NOT ADVISE THE JUVENILE 
THAT HE HAD A RIGHT TO SEE HIS GRANDPARENTS PRIOR TO ANY 
QUESTIONING. IN FACT, THE JUVENILE IN PATRICK DID NOT EVEN 
... 
ASK TO SEE HIS GRANDPARENTS. 
ANOTHER AREA OF CONCERN IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN 
OFFICER ACTS IN REASONABLE GOOD FAITH RELIANCE IN ENFORCING 
A STATUTE THAT IS LATER DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL. IN 
CALIFORNIA THE COURTS HAVE SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE RESULTING 
FROM AN ARREST MADE BY THE POLICE WHEN THE COURT LATER 









UNCONSTITUTIONAL. JENNINGS V. S. COURT 104 C.A.3d 50. 
UNDER MICIDGAN V. DE FILLIPPO 443 U.S. 31, THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT RULED THAT AN ARRESTING OFFICER, ACTING IN 
GOOD FAITH, CAN ENFORCE ORDINANCES AS THEY ARE WRITTEN. 
WHAT SOME APPELLATE COURT MAY LATERDO TO THAT ORDINANCE 
IS IRRELEVANT AND DOES NOT SOMEHOW MAK.E THE DEFENDANT 
LESS GUILTY OR THE POLICE CONDUCT "ILLEGAL." IT ALSO 
BEARS ASKING WHAT PURPOSE IS SERVED TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
UNDER THESE LAST MENTIONED CASES. WOULD THE POLICE IN 
ANTICIPATION THAT SOME COURT SOMEWHERE MAY STRIKE DOWN ANY 
STATUTE BE DETERRED FROM ENFORCING EVERY STATUTE? IS THAT 
A GOAL OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE? CERTAINLY NOT ONE 
ENUNCIATED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT. 
THE COMPARISONS MADE IN THE AFORMENTIONED CASES COMPEL 
ME TO CONCLUDE THAT THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS TO AN 
EVEN GRE~TER DEGREE THAN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 
FAILED TO DEVELOP WORKABLE RULES AND HAS EXCLUDED EVIDENCE 
INCASES OF MERE TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS WHERE THERE IS VIRTUALLY 
NO DETERRENT EFFECT FROM THE RULING. AND SO IN CALIFORNIA 
WE ARE HOLDING TRIALS IN WHICH THE TRUTH IS SUPPRESSED AND IN 
WHICH THE WITNESSES, IN SPITE OF THEIR OATHS, ARE FORBIDDEN 
TO TELL THE TRUTH EVEN WHEN DECISIONS OF THE U.s. SUPREME 
COURT DO NOT COMPEL SUCH A RESULT. 
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IT APPEARS THAT BECAUSE OF A MISPLACEMENT OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE'S PURPOSE IN CALIFORNIA, TRUTHFUL, PROBATIVE 
AND RELIABLE EVIDENCE IS EXCLUDED. SOMETIMES UNQUESTIONABLy 
GUILTY PERSONS GO FREE, SOME NEVER GET CHARGED. SOMETIMES 
EXCLUSION RESULTS IN A REDUCTION IN CHARGES. THE DIFFICULTY 
I HAVE WITH THE ABOVE RESULT IS THAT IN CALIFORNIA IT OCCURS 
TOO OFTEN IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO BENEFIT SUCH AS THE 
DETERRENCE OF UNREASONABLE POLICE CONDUCT-- WHERE THE 
EXCLUSION APPEARS TO RESULT MERELY FROM AN OVERLY RIGID 
AND UNNECESSARILY TECHNICAL APPLICATION OF THE RULE. 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE PURPOSE OR PURPOSES OF THE EX-
CLUSIONARY RULE, IT IS OFTENTIMES ALLEGED THAT EVEN THOUGH 
IN A PARTICULAR FACTUAL SETTING, EXCLUSION WOULD HAVE NO 
DETERRENT EFFECT AND THE CONDUCT WAS A MERE TECHNICAL 
VIOLATION THAT NONETHELESS THE EXCLUSION IS JUSTIFIED AS 
UPHOLDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT. YET THE "INTEGRITY" 
PURPOSE IS VALID ONLY WHEN APPLIED IN A CASE SUCH AS CAHAN 
(OFFICERS KICKING DOWN DOORS, ETC.) AND TO OTHER SUCH CASES 
WHERE THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE COULD DETER SUCH UN-
REASONABLE POLICE CONDUCT. CERTAINLY A COGENT ARGUMENT 
CAN BE MADE THAT TO ALLOW THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED IN SUCH A FLAGRANT AND DETERRABLE MANNER COULD 








IS OBTAINED AS, IN THE COURT'S WORDS IN CAHAN, AS .A RESULT 
OF A MINOR INTRUSION OF PRIVACY OR AS THE RESULT OF A GOOD 
FAITH MISTAKE OF JUDGMENT ON A POLICE OFFICER'S PART, ITS 
EXCLUSION WHICH CAUSES NO DETERRENCE OF UNREASONABLE 
POLICE CONDUCT DOES NOT AID THE COURT IN UPHOLDING ITS 
INTEGRITY -- RATHER SUCH EXCLUSION OFTEN RESULTS IN A LOSS 
OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND PERCEIVED INTEGRITY. 
CONSIDER, IF YOU WILL, THE INTEGRITY ARGUMENT ESPECIALLY 
IN LIGHT OF CHIEF JUSTICE WRIGHT'S REFERENCE TO A "LITTLE" 
PERJURY IN DISBROW. HOW MUCH IS THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME 
COURT REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT ITS INTEGRITY WHEN IT ALLOWS 
ITS COURTROOMS TO OPENLY ALLOW INTO EVIDENCE PERJURED 
TESTIMONY? IT IS MY POSITION THAT THE INTEGRITY PURPOSE HAS 
VALIDITY ONLY WHERE THE DETERRENCE PURPOSE VALIDLY APPLIES. 
TO ALLEGE INTEGRITY AS A PURPOSE FOR EXCLUSION WHERE 
DETERRENCE IS NOT PRESENT RESULTS IN A SHAM REASON FOR 
EXCLUSION. IF THERE IS NO UNREASONABLE VIOLATION AND THERE 
IS NO CONDUCT THAT CAN BE DETERRED, IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THERE 
IS ALSO NO HARM TO THE COURT 1S INTEGRITY IF THE EVIDENCE IS 
ADMITTED. INDEED, THE PUBLIC BLAMES THE COURTS FOR 
RELEASING CRIMINALS ON TECHNICALITIES. THE PUBLIC DOES NOT 
BLAME THE POLICE. THE PLAIN AND SIMPLE FACT IS THAT A 
SIGNIFICANT REASON OUR CRII\fiNAL COURTS ARE IN SUCH DISREPUTE 
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TODAY IS THAT THE PUBLIC PERCEIVES THEM AS A PLACE WHERE 
GUILTY PEOPLE ARE OFTEN FREED ON TECHNICALITIES RATHER 
THAN BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CRIMES. 
CALIFORNIA HAS LOST SIGHT OF THE GOALS LAID DONN IN 
CAHAN. CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE CARRIED TO THE EXTREME 
WHAT CAHAN ACCUSED THE FEDERAL COURTS OF DOING WITH THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE. THE COURT IN CAHAN STATED WHEN 
OVERRULING THE PRIOR CASES REJECTING THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE, "SINCE EXPERIENCE IS OF ALL TEACHERS THE MCST 
DEPENDABLE, AND SINCE EXPERIENCE IS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS, 
IT FOLLOWS THAT A RULE OF EVIDENCE AT ONE TIME THOUGHT 
NECESSARY TO THE ASCERTAINMENT OF TRUTH SHOULD YIELD 
TO THE EXPERIENCE OF A SUCCEEDING GENERATION WHENEVER 
THAT EXPERIENCE HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE FALLACY 
OR UNWISDOM OF THE OLD RULE." IN THE ZS YEARS SINCE CAHAN 
THE EXPERIENCE REQUIRES ANOTHER CHANGE. A COMPARISON 
OF THE FACTS IN CAHAN AND ITS FLAGRANT AND DETERRABLE 
CONDUCT WITH MANY OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT CASES 
FOLLOWING CAHAN IN WHICH CASES THE CONDUCT OF THE POLICE 
IS NEITHER FLAGRANT NOR DETERRABLE CAN LEAD ONE TO 
BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CLEAR INABILITY OR REFUSAL 
OF OUR COURT TO FOLLOW THE PURPOSE OF CAHAN. 









PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION Z8 
NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF TillS 
CONSTITUTION OR CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 1538.5, 
EVIDENCE SHALL NOT BE EXCLUDED OR LIMITED FOR ANY PURPaiE 
IN ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY OTHER STATUTE 
OR AS REQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
BECAUSE THERE IS DOUBT SURROUNDING THE QUESTION 
WHETHER THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
REQUIRED OR IS A JUDICIAL PROCEDURE CAPABLE OF ABOLITION 
BY THE LEGISLATURE,THIS PROPOSAL CLEARLY PLACES SUCH 
POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE U.s. 
CONSTITUTION AS ENUNCIATED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
AND PROVIDES THAT THE LEGISLATURE IF IT FINDS IT NECESSARY 
.... MAY EXPAND THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH EXCLUSION MAY OCCUR. 
-
BY THIS AMENDMENT CALIFORNIA 1S LEGISLATURE, IN 
OPEN PUBLIC DEBATES, WILL DETERMINE AFTER EXTENSIVE 
HEARINGS WHAT, IF ANY, RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE PLACED UPON 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE BEYOND THOSE PROVIDED FOR BY 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
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I WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT I DO NOT OFFER THIS PROPOSED 
AMENDMENT AS A TOTAL PANACEA TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE RULE. 
NOR DO I CONTEND THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS 
SUFFICIENTLY DEALT WITH ALL OF THE SHORTCOMINGS ASCRIBED 
TO IT IN CAHAN. WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT IT'S TLT\A:E THAT WE 
STATED, THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, THAT IT IS OUR 
INTENTION IN THIS STATE TO HAVE AN APPLICATION OF 4TH AMENDMENT 
PRINCIPLES CONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT AND TO LEAVE QUESTIONS OF EXPANSION OF THE RULE 'IO 
OUR STATE LEGISLATURE. 
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Q_ September 26, 1980 Alameda County District Attorney's Office (Lowell Jensen) 
The California Exclusionary Rule - 1980 
"The Exclusionary Rule" is a judicially declared rule of law which implements the 
prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and 
holds that contraband or other forms of incriminating evidence must be suppressed and 
must not be admitted against a defendant in a criminal trial when such evidence was 
obtained by unlawful police activity. The Rule was first expressed by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1914 in Weeks v. U.S.; was introduced to California by the 1954 
decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Cahan; and was extended to all 
the states of the union in obedience to the Fourteenth Amendment by the 1961 decision 
of the United State., Supreme Court in ~ v. Ohio. The Rule is implemented in 
California procedure through the statutory framework of Penal Code Section 1538.5. 
The purpose of the Rule is to provide an effective deterrent to illegal police action. As 
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Elkins v. U.S., 
"Its purpose is to deter - to compel respect for 
the Constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way - by removing the 
incentive to disregard it", 
and in Terry v. Ohio, that the Rule's "major thrust is a deterrent one". 
It is also said (by the Elkins Court) that another purpose of the Rule is to prevent Courts 
from being, "accomplices in the wilful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to 
uphold". This purpose is described as "the imperative of judicial integrity". 
The Rule and its continued elaboration is the subject, it is fair to say, of significant 
controversy. Some propose to totally eliminate the Rule by creating a "meaningful 
alternative". It is my position that the rule should be retained but legislatively 
modified. Why? Because the Rule has been distorted in practice and is now being used 
to suppress evidence which has been obtained by completely lawful police conduct. In 
case after case evidence is suppressed not because of unlawful police conduct, but 
because the Court has changed the law after the search was conducted. Law 
enforcement frustration in these cases is exacerbated when public confidence in the 
police is eroded by reports of evidence lost due to "illegal" police condu~t. The latest 
development, due to an increasingly intense and sophisticated public scrutiny of the 
judiciary, seems to be a loss of public respect for the Courts themselves. (See attached 
S.F. Examiner editorial of February 17, 1980). When California adopted the Exclusionary 
Rule the Cahan Court expressed concern over the possibility of "arbitrary" application 
of the Rule producing "needless confusion", but at the same time expressed confidence 
that California Courts would instead create "workable rules". Unfortunately, confusion 
now reigns and it is time that the Legislature take remedial action. 
Legislation should address these basic issues: 
1. Retroactivity. Searches conducted in conformity to existing law ought not to be 
suppressed. 
2. "Good faith" police searches. Where the existing law is not clear, suppression 
should be limited to those cases where the officer acts in bad faith. 
I 
3. Search warrant validity. Where the officer honestly and completely discloses all 
information to the Judge there should be no suppression. 
4. The "Vicarious Exclusionary Law". There should be no such standing rule in California. 
1. 
There are recent cases which illustrate the problems in contemporary Exclusionary Rule 
interpretation in each of these areas. 
1. Retroactivity. 
People v. Smith. A Berkeley police officer investigating a car theft learned that 
the mother of suspect Smith was in the Berkeley jail having been arrested on a 
warrant the night before. The officer exa mined property, held in a police locker, 
which had been taken from her when she had been booked the night before and 
found a set of keys to another stolen car and an address written on the back of a 
driver's license. The car which had been stolen in Berkeley was recovered at that 
address, but Smith's conviction was reversed when the Appellate Court held that it 
should have. been suppressed as evidence because the officer should have obtained 
a search warrant before looking at the property in the police locker. The same 
month that this search took place (February 1979) in another Court of Appeal 
District, in People v. Remiro, the Court had decided that it was proper for 
Oakland police to take a set of keys, without a search warrant, from the personal 
property of the defendant taken from him earlier by Concord police at the time he 
was booked. In Remiro, the Court cited previous cases which had validated 
warrantless searches in these circumstances. In one of these cases decided in 
1966, People v. Rogers, the Court had stated, 
"During their period of police custody an 
arrested person's personal effects, like his person 
itself, are subject to reasonable inspection, 
examination, and test. (Citations). Whatever 
segregation the police make as a matter of 
internal police administration of articles taken 
from a prisoner at the time of his arrest and 
booking does not derogate the fact of their 
continued custody and possession of such 
articles." 
As the Berkeley police search in the Smith case was lawful when conducted, 
suppression of the evidence seized in order to "deter" that conduct makes no 
sense. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Exclusionary Rule is not to be 
applied retroactively. The case of U.S. v. Peltier involved a seizure of 270 pounds 
of marijuana by Border Patrol agents. The conduct of the officers was clearly 
lawful at the time the seizure was accomplished, but some 4 months later, in the 
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. case, such conduct was declared to be unlawful. In 
Peltier, the Court rejected the defense contention that the Almeida-Sanchez rule 
should be applied retroactively and that the evidence should be suppressed, holding 
that, 
" ••. we cannot regard as blameworthy those 
parties who conform their conduct to the 
prevailing statutory or ·constitutional norm. 
(Citations). If the purpose of the Exclusionary 
Rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then 
evidence obtained from a search should be 
suppressed only if it can be said that the law 
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may 
properly be charged with knowledge,. that the 




Shortly after its watershed Cahan decision the California Supreme Court held, in 
People v. Kitchens, that the new Exclusionary Rule was to be applied 
retroactively to searches conducted before Cahan was decided. It was 
clear,however, that at that time the Court contemplated application of the Rule 
to illegal searches and did not deal with the issue of suppression in the context of 
lawful searches. From time to time, later California cases have denied 
retroactive application to new rules. In People v. Kaanehe, the Supreme Court 
considered whether or not the recently decided rule of People v. Burrows 
(requiring search warrants to examine bank records) should be applied 
retroactively and decided that it should not be so applied. The Court opined that 
retroactivity is generally reserved for those cases where the right vindicated is 
one essential to the integrity of the fact-finding process and that Burrows was not 
such a case, stating: 
"Exclusion is not necessary to ensure the 
reliability of the fact finding process at trial. 
No compulsion is present and the evidence seized 
is entirely trustworthy. As the purpose of the 
Exclusionary Rule in those circumstances is to 
deter illegal conduct by law enforcement 
officials, exclusion of evidence seized prior to 
the pronouncement of a decision does not further 
compliance with that decision." 
It may be argued, then, that upon proper analysis, California law already 
recognizes that the Exclusionary Rule should not be applied where the existing law 
is changed by a new decision. But that analysis is not required. Legislation should 
condition suppression on conduct unlawful at the time of the search, protect 
searches conducted in conformance to prevailing law, and thereby adhere to the 
true rationale of the Exclusionary Rule. 
2. "Good faith" searches. 
People w. Pace. In March 1977 Union City police arrested Pace in a city park and 
opened the lunchbox he carried to find some identification. Instead they found a 
quantity of PCP, marijuana, and cocaine. A Court of Appeal decided in Aprill979 
that the conviction should be reversed because the police had ri~t obtained a 
search warrant before opening the lunchbox. Now compare People v. Flores 
decided by another division of the same Court of Appeal District in December 
1979. Flores was arrested by Fremont police who searched the canvas shoulderbag 
he was carrying and found PCP and marijuana. This search was found to be lawful 
and the conviction was affirmed. This division of the Court knew about Pace but 
just plain disagreed with that opinion, stating, 
"In view of its overbroad analysis, we find the 
reasoning in Pace to be unpersuasive." 
The San Francisco case celebrated in the attached Examiner editorial involved a 
January 1980 arrest and subsequent warrantless search of a brief case carried by 
the defendant which produced incriminating evidence. The case was thrown out 
after the evidence was suppressed by a trial court using the Pace decision as 
precedent. Why was this not a lawful search on the basis of theF10res decision? 
We simply do not know. The trial Court did not discuss Flores. In fact we do not 
know what would happen tomorrow in another trial court. All we know is that the 
3. 
law on the subject, is, to say the least, unclear. 
In another area of the law where the question is search warrant or no search 
warrant, a recent case casts doubt on present decisional law which clearly permits 
police to open the trunk of a car without a warrant where they have probable 
cause to do so. In People v. Rodriguez, decided in February 1980, the Court 
decided that new and different rules obtained and suppressed evidence found in 
such a search because the police did not obtain a search warrant. The Court 
hastened to add, however, 
"· .• it is not surprising, under the circumstances, 
that Officer Kingsley should be uncertain as to 
what the law required him to do. (Citation). We 
ourselves are hardly in a position to act with 
absolute certainty." 
The Court had earlier described its analytic problem in these terms, 
"Indeed, for sheer doctrinal obscurity few areas 
of the law can compete with the 'rules' governing 
warrantless searches of automobiles." 
We say that, under such circumstances, the honest and reasonable conduct of 
Officer Kingsley is not, "unlawful", and does not warrant Exclusionary Rule 
nullification. 
Legislation should hold that the conduct of an officer which is subjectively in good 
faith and objectively reasonable, in a legal context where there is no fixed 
decisional or statutory norm, is not within the prohibition of the Exclusionary 
Rule. There are existing decisions which lend support to this concept. In Peltier 
the United States Supreme Court reviewed cases which had involved retroactivity 
analysis and stated: 
"The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that 
if the law enforcement officers reasonably 
believed in good faith that evidence they had 
seized was admissible at trial, the 'imperative of 
judicial integrity' is not offended by the 
introduction into evidence of this material even 
if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure 
have broadened the Exclusionary Rule to 
encompass evidence seized in that manner." 
The California case of People v. Newell is to the same effect. In this case a 
Contra Costa County Sheriff's detective responded to a reported burglary of a 
store in a shopping center. At the scene he found that a hole had been cut through 
the store wall. He climbed through the hole, found that the premises were vacant, 
found a paper bag on the floor, and a sales receipt in the bag which led to the 
defendant. The Court affirmed the conviction rejecting a defense contention that 
the officer should have had a search warrant to go through the hole, pick up the 
bag, and look at its contents. In its Exclusionary Rule analysis the Court says: 
"But perhaps the most important consideration of 
all in determining whether otherwise admissible 
4. 
and further: 
evidence shall be suppressed is the purpose, or 
intent, or good or bad faith of the government 
agent in searching for, and seizing it." 
"His conduct throughout disclosed nothing other 
than a conscientious 'good faith' purpose to 
enforce the law and to bring the vacant store's 
burglars to justice •.• And were we to assume, 
which we do not, that under the complex rules 
and divergent views and interpretations of the 
law of 'search and seizure', the detective had 
erred, it may not reasonably be said that he was 
negligent. For on a subject where judges and 
scholars disagree a policeman's good faith 
decision may not rationally be faulted." 
Newell, is, however, clearly exceptional. The recent Supreme Court decision in 
People v. Teresinski illustrates the present approach in California. In that case a 
Dixon police officer stopped a car in the belief that the occupants were in 
violation of a local curfew law. The Court found the detention unlawful and 
suppressed the testimony of the victim of a Woodland robbery committed by the 
driver of the car less than an hour before the car stop because that identification 
was achieved by "exploitation" of the illegality. To the contention that the 
officer's conduct was a "reasonable mistake of law", the Court responded: 
"Courts on strong policy grounds have generally 
refused to excuse a police officer's mistake of 
law. • •• We need not decide, however, whether 
under exceptional circumstances an officer's 
reasonable mistake of law might validate police 
conduct because in this case the officer's 
mistake cannot be found reasonable." 
There is strong support in the Federal law, however, for exempting "good faith" 
searches from the Exclusionary Rule. : ·· 
In an important recent (July 31, 1980) decision, (U.S. v. Williams), the U.S. Court of 
Appeal for the 5th Circuit considered a search incident to an arrest by a DEA 
agent for "bail jumping" which revealed that the defendant was again running 
heroin. To the contention that the arrest was unlawful the Court held: 
Sitting en bane, we now hold that evidence is not 
to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule 
where it is discovered by officers in the course 
of actions that are taken in good faith and in the 
reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are 
authorized. We do so because the exclusionary 
rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by 
police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where 
the reason for the rule ceases, it application 
must cease also. The costs to society of applying 
5. 
the rule beyond the purposes it exists to serve 
are simply too high -in this instance the release 
on the public of a recidivist drug smuggler -with 
few or no offsetting benefits." 
The view from the 8th Circuit is apparently different. In U.S. v. Schleis, it is held 
that · --
While the meaning of the Court's language is not 
entirely clear, we do not read United States v. 
Peltier (citation), as reflecting a new approach 
that an Exclusionary Rule would only be applied 
in bad faith violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
(citation). We cannot believe that the Court 
means that an application of the Exclusionary 
Rule is to turn on the subjective state of mind of 
the officer conducting the challenged search." 
One is moved to ask, why not? We seem to have no difficulty in probing other 
states of mind and assessing the reasonableness of past conduct. Consider, in this 
regard, People v. Russell, decided in January 1980. Here police had opened a car 
trunk, unzipped a flight bag and found some marijuana. On appeal it was 
contended that trial counsel was incompetent under People v. Pope, which 
requires that counsel, "act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent 
attorneys", because he had not asserted that opening the flight bag required a 
search warrant as held in People v. Dalton. The Court rejected the contention 
that the attorney was incompetent, as follows: 
"It is first noted that the hearing on Russell's 
motion to suppress evidence occurred February 
13, 1979. The opinion of People v. Dalton was 
filed six months later, August 16, 1979. It is 
doubtful that Pope requires, under pain of being 
held to have furnished constitutionally 
inadequate representation, such prescience on 
the part of a lawyer for one criminally accused." 
Eminently reasonable you say. How then do we possibly justify maintaining a system 
where we do require "such prescience" on the part of a police officer, faced (under far 
more pressing circumstances) with precisely the same question as the defense lawyer, 
and blithely suppress the evidence of crime he has seized? We say eminently 
unreasonable. Legislation should remedy this state of affairs, to permit "good faith" 
searches, .and, once again, limit the Exclusionary Rule to its true rationale. 
3. Search Warrant Validity. 
People v. Schmidt, decided in February 1980. An affidavit executed by a Eureka 
police officer in December 1977 supported the reliability of an informant by 
reference to previous reliable information supplied by him in 1970 and 1971 in 
another County. The Judge read the affidavit, issued the search warrant, and the 
evidence leading to conviction was seized. On appeal, the case was reversed 
because the Appellate Court decided that in cases where a once credible 







be re-established before his new information can be used. The Appeals Court 
acknowledged that this is a new rule, there being no previous decisions on the 
question. There is not the slightest hint of police misconduct in this case. Upon 
issuance, the search warrant imposes a duty on the police to carry out a judicial 
order. Surely we do not intend to deter the police conduct in this case by 
suppression of the evidence. As a general rule we can say that police ought to be 
encouraged to seek "neutral and detached" judicial review of contemplated 
searches, that is what search warrants are all about. On the other hand, no one 
has suggested that a potential purpose of the Exclusionary Rule is to deter judicial 
misconduct, although that is the only apparent rationale for use in cases like this. 
Suppression should never be used in search warrant cases where there has been no 
police misconduct by misrepresentation or by withholding information necessary 
for the juoicial decision. Cahan and ~ were warrantless searches and t11e 
extension of the Exclusionary Rule to warrant searches has happened gradually 
and essentially without an articulated rationale. In an early Federal case, U.S. v. 
Soyka, Circuit Judge Friendly spoke of "grotesquely inappropriate" applications of 
the Exclusionary Rule. People v. Schmidt qualifies. 
4. The Vicarious Exclusionary Law. 
People v. Dunn. Late one night Berkeley police stopped and questioned two 
young women on University Avenue on the belief that they were prostitutes. It turned 
out that they were 15 years old, they were prostitutes, and that the defendant was their 
pimp, and that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the girls. His subsequent 
conviction was reversed. The Court first acknowledged that California allows vicarious 
claims of suppression via the Exclusionary Rule, next, 
the Court holds that the "investigatory stop" was an unlawful detention because 
the officers had, 
"no objectively reasonable basis for their belief 
that the women were prostitutes ••• " 
The stage is now set for the coup de grace, to wit: "the Exclusionary Rule is 
triggered by the illegality ••. evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful 
detention, here the incriminating testimony of the young women could not be 
admitted against him." The mind boggling result is that the 15 year old sexually 
abused victim is not permitted to testify against the pimp who ·committed the 
crimes upon her. The Exclusionary Rule remedy of suppression should be 
available to the offended person only, it should not be possible for a person to 
claim that the rights of another person were violated. 
Vicario s suppression is not permitted in Federal courts (Alderman v. U.S.), and is 
therefore a matte~: for individual State decision. To our knowledge, at the present 
t ime, 48 states and the Federal courts do not permit vicarious suppression and it is 
permitted in 2 states only, California and Michigan. Is this rule compelled by the 
California Constitution? There appears to be no definitive answer. The Supreme 
Court has raised and avoided the question in Kaplan v. Superior Court. In that 
case the Court considered the possible application of newly enacted Evidence 
Code Section 351 on the "rule of standing" (a.k.a. the vicarious exclusionary rule) 
previously stated in People v. Martin, if that rule was deemed to be 
Constitutionally compelled. The Court held that: 
7. 
"It follows that even though the Martin rule may 
not be 'required by' the prevailing federal 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment • . • it 
is at least 'based on' the Constitutionally 
compelled Cahan and ~ principles. 
"By the very terms of the comment to Section 
351, therefore, it is exempt from the operation of 
that section", 
and in an explanatory footnote: 
·"This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to 
reach defendant's Constitutional arguments that 
•.• the Martin rule is required by the search and 
seizure clause of the California 
Constitution. • • Nothing we say here, however, 
is meant to foreclose consideration of those 
issues when it is appropriate to do so." 
In pragmatic terms then legislative action on this issue is not foreclosed. True 
enough the Supreme Court will, as always, have the final say. It is, however, a 
matter of legislative wisdom whether or not the Court is given the opportunity to 
decide the final question. It seems clear to us that the present Martin "rule of 
standing" is a terrible rule which the Legislature should repeal and thereby force 
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